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Regulation in a Liberal State:
The Role of Non-Commodity Values
Richard B. Stewartt
This Article aims to clarify the background understandings that inform
and structure regulatory and administrative law'-fields of law long criti-
cized as undisciplined and unordered. A great appeal of the law and eco-
nomics movement was its promise of a single jurisprudential framework
sufficiently general and trenchant to provide a unifying order, here and
elsewhere. That movement has provoked competing unitary theories.' The
inconclusive battle among these theories has reawakened skepticism as to
the possibility of any successful unitary theory. The effort to structure law
is now shifting to complex theories composed of several different concep-
tions of legal ordering.3 Such theories are symptomatic of what we might
call a post law-and-economics era. They try to avoid procrustean distor-
tions by responding to the law's richness and intricacy without lapsing
into nominalism.
This Article is part of this emerging genre. Although not offering a
fully developed theory, it argues that administrative and regulatory law
reflect several competing background understandings of the ends of gov-
ernment: the protection of entitlements, the promotion of production, and
the nurture of non-commodity values. It shows how these three concep-
tions are related to American liberal traditions of law and political theory,
t" Byrne Professor of Administrative Law, Harvard University. Bruce Ackerman, Charles Fried,
Frank Michelman, Steven Shavell, Cass Sunstein, and Stephen Thernstrom provided helpful com-
ments on earlier drafts of this Article. This Article has also benefited from comments at faculty work-
shops at the University of Chicago and Harvard Law Schools.
1. This Article is concerned with "economic" regulation, which conventionally includes price, ser-
vice, and entry regulation to control market power or economic rents, and those aspects of "social"
regulation (including environmental protection, consumer protection, and health, safety and broadcast
regulation) that seek to correct other "market failures" involving physical or economic spillovers. For
an analysis of various forms of regulation, see S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982).
2. See, e.g., C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981); Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in
a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973). A different form of unitary theory, not directly responsive to the claims of
the law and economics movement, is J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). This phenomenon of
grand unitary theories is analyzed in Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 561, 574-76 (1983).
3. See, e.g., J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1978); Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management Trea-
tises, 94 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1981); Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1195 (1982). Bruce Ackerman's Foreword to this symposium invites such scholarship.
See Ackerman, Law in the Activist State, 92 YALE L.J. 1083, 1085 (1983).
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and to the problems in reconciling regulation with liberal principles. A
principal aim of the Article is to develop the concept of non-commodity
values and show that their nurture is, and should be, an important objec-
tive of regulatory and administrative law.
Liberalism has repeatedly been attacked as an impoverished creed that
ignores the social context of human development. If conceptions of the
good are individual, and if government is forbidden to endorse any single
form of the good, then society seems reduced to a system in which each
individual seeks to extract the largest feasible portion of available re-
sources in order to promote his own private ends. A market economy is
claimed to be the institutional archetype of such a conception of society.
According to this critique of liberalism, the market economy stunts per-
sonal development by narrowing the terms of human association and fos-
tering commodity consumption as a dominant value. Competition for ma-
terial advantage also assertedly breeds egoism, undermining the
infrastructure of mutual trust upon which society (including the market)
ultimately depends. Thus capitalist liberalism was caricatured and at-
tacked in the nineteenth century;4 thus it is today.' This, like all carica-
tures, is overdrawn but has important elements of truth. The nurture of
non-commodity values is the appropriate response.
Part I examines the general relationship between the liberal tradition
and regulation. Part II discusses and rejects the minimalist liberal thesis
that regulatory statutes should be interpreted as "deals" among competing
private interests. Parts III and IV discuss two other conceptions of the
proper role for regulation and administrative law in the liberal
state-protection of entitlements and maximization of wealth-and dis-
cuss the limits of their explanatory and justificatory power. Parts V and
VI discuss the proper role of non-commodity values in regulatory and ad-
ministrative law. The discussion throughout relies on examples from envi-
ronmental and broadcast regulation.
Clarifying the concepts of entitlement, wealth-maximization, and non-
commodity values will not by itself resolve hard choices or hard cases. But
it will serve to focus and discipline thinking about the ends and means of
administrative regulation not only on the part of scholars and judges but
also of legislators, administrators, and others who have a hand in shaping
regulatory law. These conceptions, which are firmly rooted in the liberal
tradition, may appropriately be understood as the foundations of an ad-
4. See K. MARX, CAPITAL 163-77 (Fowkes trans. 1977) (1st ed. 1867) (discussing "The Fetish-
ism of Commodities").
5. See, e.g., F. HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH 84-94 (1976); W. MCWILLIAMS, THE IDEA
OF FRATERNITY IN AMERICA 109-10 (1973).
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Regulation in Liberal State
ministrative constitution-a charter of basic principles for regulatory and
administrative law.
I. Liberal Principles and Regulatory Law
While it would be foolhardy to attempt to formulate a definitive creed,
the argument which follows requires a prefatory sketch of liberal princi-
ples and their relation to problems of administrative justice.' Accordingly,
I first discuss the link between basic liberal principles and regulatory law.
I then focus on the historical conditions of American liberalism7 and the
implications flowing from the rise of centralized regulation.
A. Neutrality and the Prohibition of Coerced Wealth Transfers
Liberal theory affirms the equal right and opportunity of each individ-
ual to pursue her own conception of the good.' Government aids this en-
terprise by securing individuals' private and political liberties, underwrit-
ing private agreements and associations, and providing other nurturing
social services (such as education) and other collective goods (such as
healthy environments). This view is not skeptical or agnostic about moral
norms. Indeed, it insists upon respect for the moral value of citizens'
rights and of liberal institutions, such as the rule of law, designed to pro-
tect those rights. Like every legal and political theory, it rests on poten-
tially controversial value choices. Its premise is that the ultimate good for
men and women is plural and can be realized only by voluntary efforts,
both individual and concerted. Society is understood as a mutual enter-
prise in realizing many forms of excellence that no single individual can
achieve.' Accordingly, government must strive to remain neutral among
competing conceptions of the good, while simultaneously securing the ca-
pacity of individuals and associations to realize their chosen ends. Apply-
ing this ideal to the far-reaching activities of modern regulatory govern-
ment raises several dilemmas examined in this Article.1"
6. For an earlier discussion of this subject, see Stewart, The Reformation of American Adminis-
trative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1671-76 (1975).
7. For various accounts of American liberalism, see, e.g., L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN
AMERICA (1955); S. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS, THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY (1981); R.
KELLEY, THE TRANSATLANTIC PERSUASION (1969).
8. We need not consider here whether the master premise of liberalism is neutrality, see B. ACK-
ERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10-12, 43-45, 327-48 (1980), or equal concern and
respect, see Dworkin, What Liberalism Isn't, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Jan. 20, 1983, at 47. How far these
can be meaningfully separated is problematic. Liberal theory rests on the potentially paradoxical view
that "freedom in the fullest sense implies both variety and equality." L. HARTZ, supra note 7, at 57.
9. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-22 (1971); . J. PASSMORE, THE PERFECTABILITY OF
MAN 11-27 (1970) (surveying and rejecting theories which argue that goal of man is to achieve partic-
ular form of perfection); J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY 139-69 (1978) (recognition and integration by
legal system of different personal roles and conceptions of the good).
10. Traditionally, liberal principles such as neutrality and the ban on private wealth transfers
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A liberal design for government can seek to minimize violations of lib-
eral principles through two strategies. The "wholesale" strategy relies
upon the general design of government to minimize the probability that
measures will be adopted that violate liberal principles. The "retail" strat-
egy requires review of individual measures on a case-by-case basis.
Courts, of course, are but one of the institutional mechanisms through
which such strategies might be implemented.
The implications of liberal theory for regulatory law have traditionally
been divided into the procedural and the substantive. The procedural im-
plications are encapsulated in the idea of the rule of law: The govern-
ment's authority should be exercised in accordance with general rules
publicly acknowledged in advance and impartially applied. 1 The substan-
tive implications flow from the principle of neutrality, which bars govern-
ment from using its coercive powers in a partisan manner to advance some
citizens' particular conception of the good. 2 A corollary principle prohib-
its government from using its power simply to redistribute wealth from
some citizens to others. Consider, for example, a regulatory system that
limits entry to the interstate trucking industry, raises prices to consumers,
and gives truckers monopoly profits. On what basis are truckers to be
preferred to consumers? If the truckers' advantage reflects nothing but
their success in manipulating governmental power to their own purposes,
have been understood as imposing negative limits on the range of regulatory undertakings by govern-
ment. See R. KELLEY, supra note 7, at 242, 296-97, 324-25 (19th-century democratic aversion to
government's promoting economic development reflected fear of corruption and special interest manip-
ulation). In recent decades, however, the principle of equal concern and respect has been invoked as
an affirmative ground for government action, in areas such as regulations aimed at eliminating race or
gender discrimination in employment or housing. The theoretical and institutional implementation of
the contrast between "negative" and "positive" conceptions of liberty is, of course, a staple problem of
the liberal tradition. This Article may be understood as addressing certain aspects of this problem in
the specific context of regulation.
11. See F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 148-61 (1960); Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973); Stewart, supra note 6, at 1698-1702.
12. This Article deals with regulatory measures aimed at redressing the adverse consequences of
"economic" and social" spillovers and interdependencies. See supra note 1. It accordingly does not
address the political, theoretical, and legal problems associated with paternalistic measures that re-
strict an individual's conduct in order to protect that individual's rights or enhance his welfare. Pater-
nalistic measures aimed at coercing allegiance or conformance to a particular conception of the good
are inconsistent with liberal principles. See Note, Limiting the State's Police Power: Judicial Reaction
to John Stuart Mill, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 605 (1970); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 886-921,
938-41, 974-80 (discussing rights of privacy, personhocd, and association). How consistent other pa-
ternalistic measures are with the liberal principles sketched here raises deep and difficult issues be-
yond the scope of this Article. For a fuller discussion, see Kelman, Regulation and Paternalism, 29
PUB. POL'Y 219 (1981) (regulation which appears to be paternalistic may be justified on other
grounds); Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982) (en-
dorsing certain forms of paternalism as expressing and securing values of solidarity).
The version of liberalism developed in the text is premised on a pluralistic conception of the good.
It rejects the view that moral values are wholly subjective and cannot form a rational basis for collec-
tive action. Difficulties, of course, arise when the collective action in question is coercively enforced on
dissenters by government.
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then consumers are being forced to devote their resources to advancing the
private ends that the truckers pursue with their monopoly profits. This
transfer violates neutrality."3
These principles do not necessarily rule out income taxation and a wel-
fare state.14 But they require that "taxation by regulation" and other
transfers (or asserted restitutions) be justified on the basis of some general
societal conception of the right or the good.
Although logical corollaries, the principle of neutrality and the prohibi-
tion against coerced private wealth transfers seem, paradoxically, to con-
tradict one another. Neutrality demands that regulation secure the "public
interest" by advancing some general conception of the good; any such con-
ception is, however, controversial, and the decision to invoke it will thus
run afoul of the neutrality principle. On the other hand, if government
seeks to avoid this difficulty by furthering purely private ends, it is in
danger of violating the prohibition of coerced private wealth transfers by
employing governmental powers to aid certain groups in their struggle for
material advantage over other groups. The entitlement, wealth-
maximizing, and non-commodity values conceptions of regulation can each
be viewed as responses to this paradox.
At least since Dicey, critics have claimed that administrative regulation
poses an especially serious threat to these two liberal principles of neutral-
ity and avoidance of coerced private wealth transfers.1" In the United
States, attempts to contain this threat have relied, for the most part, on
procedural controls. Attention has focused on agency decisionmaking pro-
cedures, internal separation of functions, and the availability and scope of
13. Cf. Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874) (voiding use of city's power to issue
bonds because power was used for private benefit). Suppose, for example, a lobby of proselytizing
health food faddists persuades the Food and Drug Administration to ban all processed foods on the
ground that non-processed foods are inherently worthier because they are "natural." Such a violation
of neutrality could also be viewed as a coerced sacrifice of the resources and opportunities of
processed-food producers and consumers to the private advantage of the health food supporters.
14. Taxes are necessary to provide certain collective goods, such as public security. In addition,
the opportunity for each citizen to realize her conception of the good may be grounded in a right to a
minimum income, or to certain necessities such as food and shelter. See C. FRIED, RIGHT AND
WRONG 134-50 (1978); Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
15. See A. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 183-201
(1915). This belief has often been reflected in a sharp contrast between regulatory law and the com-
mon law. The latter has been regarded as a reasoned system of rights and duties exemplifying the
liberal conception of law, whereas regulatory law has been conceived of as an inherently discretionary
and hence unpredictable engine of political power. See, e.g., F. HAYEI,, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM
(1944); Pound, For the "Minority Report," 27 A.B.A. J. 664 (1941). Some critics, however, have
turned the analysis used to discredit regulatory law against law in general. They view all forms of
law, including judge-made law and statutory interpretation, as discretionary, "political," and violative
of liberal principles as regulatory law. See, e.g., THE POLITICS OF LAW (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Ken-
nedy, supra note 12. This Article does not address this important controversy; it examines the consis-
tency of regulation with liberal principles without attempting to decide whether regulation is a special
case.
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judicial review. The two liberal principles have also been reflected in sub-
stantive constitutional requirements that state action be neutral and that
state power to regulate, to tax and spend, and to condemn property be
exercised for public purposes."6 These requirements have not, however,
been enforced to limit the growth of administrative power in any major
way. The requirement of neutrality has been largely confined to a few
special subjects, such as race and gender discrimination, religion, and free
expression;17 the public purpose requirement has been dormant.' 8 Broad
statutory delegations of authority to agencies have made courts reluctant
to confront the elected political branches with a constitutional blunderbuss
by invalidating such statutes. Instead, judges have used selective, non-
constitutionally based techniques of review and control-including proce-
dural requirements and statutory interpretation-to deal with the most
troubling exercises of the delegated power by bureaucratic agencies.
This strategy has been accompanied, during the past fifteen years, by
an accelerating loss of public and professional confidence in the perform-
ance of regulatory agencies. Economists and public interest advocates have
expressed concern with the "capture" of regulatory power by factional
interests. 9 Courts have sought to promote "interest representation" and
16. See Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 664 (1874) ("[wle have established...
beyond cavil that there can be no lawful tax which is not laid for a public purpose") (emphasis in
original); T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER
OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION, 258-64 (state can legislate only "for the public good, and
not for the benefit of individuals"); Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 128 (equal protection clause prohibits unprincipled distribution
of public goods to private parties).
The federal structure of American government, the separation of powers within the national gov-
ernment, and the non-delegation doctrine can be understood as wholesale strategies designed to reduce
the danger of violations of the two liberal tenets. The danger that broad regulatory statutes could be
used for illiberal ends is a traditional justification for invalidating such statutes as unconstitutional
delegations of legislative authority.
17. A broader application of the neutrality principle is reflected in decisions such as Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), which struck
down state restrictions on private education as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. For an effort
to explain Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which invalidated state abortion statutes, in these
terms, see Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due
Process ofLife and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 40-43 (1973).
18. There are, however, some signs of the requirement's revival. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764-65 (1976) (free flow of
commercial speech is "a matter of public interest"); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C.
Cir.) (FCC must consider television viewer choice and welfare, rather than broadcast industry protec-
tion, as dominant consideration in making policy), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
For recent discussion of the public purpose requirement in the context of economic regulation, see
Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976) (discussing judicial review of legisla-
tive means and goals); Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law,
54 TUL. L. REV. 849, 876 (1980) (promoting "constitutional right to demand that public law be
public regarding"); Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Re-
view?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 487, 509 (1979) (criticizing welfare economic analysis for ignoring
non-individualist consensus).
19. See, e.g., R. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMMISSION 1-40 (1970) (describing
transportation industry's influence on ICC); G. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE (1975) (argu-
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have adopted a "hard look" standard of review in order to control admin-
istrative policy-making.20 Public distrust of regulatory performance has
become an important factor in national politics. These developments re-
flect, I believe, a widespread perception that existing regulatory programs
violate liberal principles. Regulation is viewed as a self-serving tool,
manipulated either by well-organized economic interest groups to increase
their wealth,2" or by ideological factions to impose their partisan values on
society.22 These reactions attest to the continuing vitality of liberal
principles.
B. The Historical Context of Liberalism and Regulation in the United
States
The abstract account of liberal principles and legal doctrine sketched
above must be placed in the historical context of American conditions and
experience. To equate liberalism with a society in which solitary, atom-
ized individuals independently pursue a private and subjective conception
of the good is not only a caricature, but a highly misleading one. Ameri-
can liberalism has embodied a more ample vision, one based upon associa-
tional values. Hostility to organizations standing between the citizen and
the central government has been more characteristic of the monarchical
and revolutionary nation states of Europe than of the United States. Lack-
ing a feudal past and the need to extirpate it, and facing the need to
accommodate a variety of dissenting religious sects, Americans developed a
social, political, and legal system in which different local communities and
voluntary organizations each collectively pursued divergent conceptions of
the good.2s This pattern expresses the liberal premise that the good is both
plural and an appropriate object of concerted discussion and action. The
values associated with decentralized, associational liberalism have, how-
ever, been undermined by industrialization and the rise of nationwide
markets, and by regulatory responses to the social and economic effects of
these developments.
ing that regulation is generally conducted for the benefit of regulated industry rather than the public).
20. See Stewart, supra note 6; Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative
Procedure, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1805 (1979) (shift from adjudication to rulemaking demands new pro-
cedures to create reviewable records).
21. For a vivid journalistic account of the "special interest state" in operation, see Drew, A Re-
porter at Large, Phase: Engagement with the Special Interest State, NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 1978, at
64.
22. See Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984); Weaver,
Regulation, Social Policy, and Class Conflict, 50 PUB. INT. 45, 57-61 (1978).
23. See 0. HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN, PATHS TO FREEDOM (1961); A. SCHLESINGER, PATHS TO
THE PRESENT 23-49 (1949); C. SMITH, PRIVATE ASSOCIATIONS, PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITERATURE
(1972). The most famous contemporary account from the 19th century is A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DE-
MOCRACY IN AMERICA (H. Reeve trans. 1841). For a skeptical view of the virtues of voluntary as-
sociations in the contemporary context, see M. HAUSKNECHT, THE JOINERS (1962).
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De Tocqueville celebrated the instinct for associational self-
determination as a distinctively American trait.24 In the first century of
the Republic, such activity was decentralized and carried on by relatively
small groups. Some groups were governmental in form, such as towns,
cities, or special-purpose authorities like school boards. Others, such as
churches, fraternal orders, working-men's associations, unions, and private
colleges, were non-governmental.
This decentralized system suited an increasingly diverse country. It also
provided a social context that nurtured a more enriched form of personal
and collective life than could occur in an arid, impersonal society of iso-
lated and self-seeking individuals. 2 5 Many of the voluntary associations
had mutual self-improvement as a principal goal-witness churches,
working-men's associations, and Chautauquas. Decentralized, small-scale
government and participation in voluntary associations promoted civic vir-
tue.2" In an environment of ethnic, religious and geographical differences,
this decentralized, associational form of liberalism promoted considerable
diversity in community values and cultures.
The tradition of decentralized association was by no means entirely be-
nign; we must avoid romanticizing the past. Small towns and churches or
other groups could impose a suffocating conformity. Many individuals
lacked the mobility required to enjoy diversity. Ethnic, religious, and geo-
graphical differences often bred mutual intolerance among groups and
communities.2 7 These drawbacks have diminished over time with im-
proved communications, greater mobility of labor and capital, and the de-
velopment and integration of markets. But the rise of national mar-
kets-and the centralized systems of regulation which they have
provoked-has also undermined the traditional system of diverse, decen-
tralized associations and communities, and diminished its capacity to
nourish a more ample form of liberalism.2"
We can see some of the costs of emerging national markets in both the
24. See 2 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 23, at 114-28. This instinct for private ordering ex-
pressed itself during the progressive era in opposition to centralized government economic manage-
ment and intervention. See R. KELLEY, supra note 7, at 30-35.
25. See 0. HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN, supra note 23; W. MCWILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 508.
The Handlins make the intriguing suggestion that Jacksonian opposition to government economic
intervention and management on the ground that it redistributed wealth in favor of "special interests"
was linked to the growing cultural pluralism of the nation, which impeded agreement on government
policy.
26. See 2 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 23, at 117-18.
27. See, e.g., I. HERRON, THE SMALL TOWN IN AMERICAN LITERATURE 91, 212, 368-69, 382-83
(1939) (describing small towns' "rigidly dogmatic moral code, provincialism, and vitiating dullness");
Berthoff, Peasants and Artisans, Puritans and Republicans: Personal Liberty and Communal Equal-
ity in American History, 69 J. AM. HIST. 579 (1982); Chesler, Imagery of Community Ideology of
Authority: The Moral Reasoning of Justice Burger, 18 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457 (1983).
28. See S. HAYS, THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM 1885-1914, at 4-6 (1957); I. HERRON, supra
note 27, at 352-53; W. MCWILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 67-68, 508-09 (1974).
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communications and environmental areas. Seventy-five years ago, Ameri-
cans relied predominantly upon local newspapers for political informa-
tion.29 They also relied upon local initiatives, largely undertaken by vol-
untary associations, for recreation and entertainment. Today, they rely
principally on national network television for both news and entertain-
ment. This development has brought with it tremendous advan-
tages-higher-quality productions, a cosmopolitan perspective, and a
greater range of available information and experience. But it has also had
important drawbacks. Civic virtue-personal responsibility for, and par-
ticipation in, collective decisionmaking-has been eroded by the relative
dearth of community-based political information and cultural activity on
television. In the view of many critics, variety and aspiration for excel-
lence have been sacrificed to a passive technology of culturally flabby en-
tertainment.30 The homogenizing forces of a mass market of advertiser-
supported programming have overtaken decentralized diversity.
An analogous development is discernible in the environmental context.
When industrial technologies were less developed and economic markets
less integrated, local and regional economies fostered considerable physical
and social diversity among the industrial and commercial northeast, the
plantation and share cropper south, the family farms of the midwest, and
the natural resource-based economies in the west. The development of na-
tional markets and new technologies has reduced, if not eliminated, vari-
ances among regional economies and patterns of life." As a result, geo-
graphical diversity in community cultures and values has declined.
Communities that seek to preserve distinctive, high-quality environments
by imposing relatively stringent environmental controls risk a loss of in-
dustry, development, and employment to communities with more lax stan-
dards.3 2 This threat acts as an homogenizing force that tends to produce
diminished environmental quality everywhere.
The "market failures" created by the development of new products and
technologies and the rise of mass markets in these and other areas pro-
voked the formation of centralized regulatory regimes.33 For example, the
development of broadcast technology without a corresponding property
29. See J. SIM, THE GRASS ROOTS PRESS: AMERICA'S COMMUNITY NEWSPAPERS 39-42 (1969);
Bagdikan, Grass Roots Press, 229 HARPERS 102 (1964).
30. See CARNEGIE COMMISSION REPORT ON EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION (1967); F. FRIENDLY,
DUE TO CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND OUR CONTROL..., 266-325 (1967); N. MINOW, EQUAL TIME 52
(1964); Note, A Regulatory Approach to Diversifying Commercial Television Entertainment, 89
YALE L.J. 694, 694-95 (1980) and sources cited therein.
31. See G. JACKSON, REGIONAL DIVERSITY 134 (1981); Rosenberg, History and Perspective, in
REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND NATIONAL POLICY 18 (K. Price ed. 1982).
32. See E. REHBINDER & R. STEWART, THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERI-
ENCE FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (forthcoming).
33. See S. BREYER, supra note 1.
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rights system in the electromagnetic spectrum created chaos that triggered
a demand for regulation. In the environmental area, pollution and toxic
waste spillovers became conspicuous examples of market failures that led
to calls for regulation.
Such regulatory programs exhibit strong centralizing tendencies, attrib-
utable to the national scope of the markets which they are designed to
regulate. Problems created by interference, and scale economies in broad-
casting, demand a regulatory program that is national in scope.34 Inter-
state mobility of products, capital, and pollution undermine local or state
environmental initiatives, and invite nationwide solutions.35 As a result,
federal regulatory programs administered by federal bureaucracies and
federal judges have, to a considerable degree, displaced decentralized
decisionmaking.
Believers in a more ample form of liberalism could adopt three re-
sponses to the homogenization and centralization engendered by mass
markets and regulation. The first would be to abandon regulation on the
supposition that regulation is a greater threat to liberal values than is the
totally unregulated market.3" The second would be to effect a radical dis-
aggregation of economic and regulatory activity, substituting self-manage-
ment by small groups and communities for large-scale business and ad-
ministrative organizations. Such disaggregation would aim to restore the
conditions that fostered associational liberalism."7 The third is to accept
the development of national markets, large-scale organizations, and a sub-
stantial degree of regulation, but to attempt, within that basic framework,
to promote the values historically associated with decentralized associa-
tional liberalism. 8 I focus on this last strategy because I think it provides
the most likely prospect for advance. 9
34. The problem of broadcast interference might be dealt with by developing a system of property
rights in the spectrum that does not rely on administrative regulation. See Coase, The Federal Com-
munications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 25-35 (1959). But this system would also have to be
national in scope and uniform in its features.
35. See E. REHBINDER & R. STEWART, supra note 32.
36. See F. HAYEK, supra note 15, at 88-100; R. HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE CORPORATION
(1979).
37. See Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980); Unger, supra note 2,
at 593-97. It has been suggested that the displacement of small-scale, self-managed 19th-century en-
terprise by large-scale enterprise was not inevitable. See S. HAYS, supra note 28, at 33-34. But see A.
CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGEMENT REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 17-19
(1977). The compatibility of small scale enterprise and governance with national or international
factor markets remains a critical and largely unexplored problem for this alternative.
38. Such an alternative should not, however, ignore the considerable but as yet unexploited oppor-
tunities for a greater measure of decentralization in existing federal regulatory programs. Many of
these opportunities involve the use of economic incentives as an alternative to the current "command
and control" system of regulation. See Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A
Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1263 (1981).
39. This is not the occasion to undertake an examination of the first two alternatives. The first, to
the extent that it would, for example, abrogate environmental regulation, seems unacceptable in terms
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II. Regulatory Programs as Deals
In this and succeeding sections of the Article, I examine several differ-
ent conceptions of government that relate regulation to traditional liberal
principles and offer a foundation for regulatory jurisprudence. This sec-
tion examines the deals conception, which sees regulatory statutes (like all
legislation) as nothing more than private interest group bargains which
ought to be judicially enforced as such.
On its face, this thesis appears inconsistent with liberal principles. It
seemingly endorses factional exploitation of government power to effect
private wealth transfers or to impose sectarian ideologies on others, and
fails to provide a public justification for the government's exercise of force.
The deals conception can, however, be understood as a "minimalist" ver-
sion of liberalism. Because ideas of the good are plural, government can,
in this view, be nothing more than a precarious system of mutual but
competitive advantage among different factions, each of which seeks to
capture all of the gains from cooperation in order to advance its own
wealth or idea of the good.40
In the deals conception's starkest form, individuals and organizations
regard government decisions in the same way they regard production and
consumption choices made in the private market-as an opportunity to
increase their wealth or preference satisfaction. Politics thus becomes a
contest among actors for the "capture" and exploitation of regulatory and
taxing and spending powers. Unless it has dictatorial power, a faction is
likely to enhance its prospects in the struggle by entering into alliances
and bargains with other factions. Because it assumes that consensus on a
single common conception of the good is impossible, the minimalist liberal
position concludes that the only function that government can have is to
facilitate and enforce whatever mutually self-interested deals factions hap-
pen to strike.
Richard Posner and William Landes have argued that this deals con-
ception provides a sound and appropriate judicial framework for public
law.' 1 In their view, law consists of the authoritative, coercively binding
both of commodity and non-commodity values. No one has yet sufficiently developed the second alter-
native to permit me to assess it here.
40. The philosophical background of the minimalist position, which ultimately traces back to
Thomas Hobbes, is examined in A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981) and T. SPRAGENS, THE
IRONY OF LIBERAL REASON (1981).
41. Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. &
ECON. 875 (1975); see also R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 405-17 (2d ed. 1977). Landes
and Posner's early work does not take explicit account of the ideologue-the person or group who
wishes to advance certain moral and ideological goals or ideals rather than personal or organizational
wealth. But the basic conception of legislation as a "deal" among competing interests can-at a con-
siderable cost in predictive power-be expanded to include ideological as well as economic factors. In
a recent article, Judge Posner has explicitly taken this step, revising his earlier views. See Posner,
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deals struck by the contending factions in the political market for public
power. Just as courts enforce private contractual deals, so should they
enforce constitutional, statutory, and administrative deals, as understood at
the time of their adoption or enactment. Posner and Landes assert that
this approach best conforms to political reality and the intent of
lawmakers, provides a relatively objective and non-"political" basis for the
exercise of judicial power, and promotes political stability.42 An analo-
gous, if less stark, view informs the recent work of John Hart Ely. 3
This view of the political process, which has a long and distinguished
pedigree in the political science literature,44 has great plausibility. Eco-
Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 270-
72 (1982). There, he classifies statutes into four groups: (1) "public interest, economically defined"
statutes (such as antitrust laws which advance consumer welfare); (2) "public interest in other senses"
statutes (e.g., a progressive income tax designed to implement a just distribution of income); (3) "pub-
lic sentiment" statutes (e.g., forbidding the sale of pornography); and (4) "narrow interest group
legislation" (e.g., the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938).
The distinction between categories (2) and (3) is obscure, and even that between (1) and (4) is
ambiguous. At some points in the article, Judge Posner seems to argue that the courts should take a
quite different approach in interpreting "public interest" statutes from that taken with statutes that
represent interest group "deals." But he fails to provide any workable criteria to distinguish these two
categories of statutes, leaving his claim for different interpretation of the two types largely useless as
far as the courts are concerned. In the effort to go beyond his original "deals" conception in order to
deal with a broader and more realistic range of statutes, Judge Posner appears to have sacrificed
much of the coherence and power of his earlier approach.
42. A modified version of Judge Posner's views is found in Michelman, Constitutions, Statutes,
and the Theory of Efficient Adjudication, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 431, 440-42 (1980).
43. J. ELY, supra note 2; Ely, Democracy and the Right to be Different, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 397
(1982). Although Dean Ely does not embrace an economic model of behavior, politics in his neo-
pluralist universe also consists of a struggle among interest groups for control of legislative power.
Ely explicitly views the legislative process as a pluralistic system of bargaining and logrolling. The
courts' role is to promote rough equality of access to this process by, for example, imposing a one-
person, one-vote rule of representation and preventing the exclusion of, or systematic discrimination
against, "discrete and insular minorities" such as blacks or Hispanics. See J. ELY, supra note 2, at
73-104. In the context of administrative law, Ely would have the courts apply the non-delegation
doctrine with considerable rigor in order to ensure that legislation is relatively specific. Id. at 73-104,
131-34. While Ely does not explicitly deal with statutory interpretation, his entire "representation-
reinforcing" strategy, as well as his skepticism about "fundamental values," would seem to imply that
courts should ordinarily strive to give effect to the statutory compromise-the "deal," if you
will-which emerges from the interest-group struggle in the legislature.
Ely does not advocate, however, that courts treat statutes as deals among self-regarding interests.
Elsewhere, he proceeds on the orthodox premise that courts should interpret statutes in accordance
with the public values that the statutes might serve. See Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87
HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974). This premise suggests that courts should regard participants in the politi-
cal process as motivated by different conceptions of the public good. Statutes may then be regarded as
"deals" or compromises among competing public-spirited factions. But this shift does not solve and
may indeed aggravate the problem of indeterminacy that is inherent in the "deals" approach. See
infra pp. 1551-53. One still requires suppletive principles-such as the conceptions examined in this
Article-to resolve the indeterminacy. The problem with Democracy and Distrust is precisely that
such conceptions do not exist or at least are not accessible to courts as a justifiable basis for the
exercise of judicial power.
44. See, e.g., A. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVER1MENT 370-72 (1908) (describing legislative
process as interplay of group interests); E. HERRING, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC IN-
TEREST (1936) (legislature has primary responsibility for achieving compromise among class and sec-
tional interests); D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC
OPINION (1951) (describing tactics of interest group influence).
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nomically self-interested actors, ideologues, and politicians who seek to
barter their competing interests are indeed the most active participants in
regulatory politics. 45 Regulatory decisionmaking usually does involve a
struggle among competing economic and ideological factions, each seeking
to use the coercive power of government to advance its own ends. There
are, however, three major flaws in the deals thesis that sharply limit its
suitability as an analytic framework for regulatory jurisprudence: inaccu-
racy, indeterminacy, and illiberality. The "realism" of the deals thesis is
no less flawed than its normative premises.
A. Inaccuracy
This thesis fails to provide an adequately accurate account of the legis-
lative process. While organized private economic and ideological interests
play a central role,46 statutes often emerge from a far more complex and
open-textured process than that which characterizes the private commer-
cial transactions that provide the model for the deals conception of public
law. Legislators and executive officials act as entrepreneurs in an environ-
ment in which often inchoate public opinions, reactions of the media and
"opinion leaders," the reciprocal dynamics of the legislative process, back-
ground expectations, the pressure of underlying socio-economic trends,
and sheer chance also play important roles.4 7 It is a gross oversimplifica-
tion to regard most statutes as the product of a bargain among a few
readily identifiable organized interests such as environmental groups and
automobile manufacturers. 48 Broadcast regulation cases exemplify the fu-
tility of attempting to resolve regulatory controversies by reference to the
private interest deals supposedly embodied in statutes. It is difficult to
discern any deal in the 1934 Communications Act that is helpful in
resolving contemporary regulatory issues, beyond a vague, widely-shared
The "interest group" approach has been elaborated with great methodological sophistication by the
new public choice theory, which uses microeconomic premises to analyze government institutions and
decisions. See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); Stigler, The The-
ory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971).
45. See E. KRASNOW, L. LONGLEY & H. TERRY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION (3d
ed. 1982); Birnbaum, Crop Controversy: Farm, Budget Officials Clash on Supply Curbs by Market-
ing Boards, Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 1982, at 1, col. 6; Drew, supra note 21, at 64.
46. Specific statutory provisions-like those in the Clean Air Act protecting the jobs of Ohio coal
miners-sometimes express clear victories by, or explicit compromises among, private interest groups.
See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 44-48 (1981).
47. For accounts of the complex factors, in addition to special interest "dealing," that underlie
social legislation, see B. Ackerman & D. Elliott, Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Case
of Environmental Law (unpublished manuscript on file with the Yale Law Journal); H. HECLO,
MODERN SOCIAL POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND SWEDEN 284-326 (1974).
48. On the other hand, if the notion of "interests" is expanded to include all of the other elements
in such a complex process, the deals concept becomes hopelessly indeterminate. See infra pp. 1551-53.
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concern to order chaos and avoid the vesting of property rights in the
electromagnetic spectrum.
It is also significant that we do not affirm a deals conception in public
discourse. This practice reflects the important fact, which the deals con-
ception disregards, that most individuals draw a distinction between the
considerations of self-interest they follow in making individual production
and consumption decisions and the considerations that are relevant to de-
cisions of public policy. Most citizens do not equate voting with shop-
ping."9 Legislators and administrators are accordingly at pains to explain
and justify their actions as securing rights or advancing some public good,
not as cementing a deal among private interests.5" The persistence of pub-
lic interest discourse on the part of legislators and administrators is con-
trary to what the deals thesis would predict. If government simply acts as
a broker of private bargains, we would instead expect that legislative and
administrative "brokers" would ensure reliable judicial and agency en-
forcement of the bargains they arrange by explicitly identifying the pri-
vate interests that are party to the bargain and specifying how a statute or
regulation was designed to promote or accommodate those interests."1
Moreover, decisional law demonstrates that courts do not regard the
regulatory enterprise as merely enforcing deals. Instead, they see the gov-
ernment's role as identifying, assessing, and weighing the relevant public
objectives that justify regulation.52 Litigants, naturally enough, pitch their
claims in such terms. Not only would a deals thesis involve a completely
different mode of discourse and analysis, but it would imply that courts
should focus on issues they rarely address, such as the precise objectives
and positions of the various interest groups politically active at the time a
statute was enacted.53
49. See Michelman, supra note 14, at 24-25; Sen, Rights and Agency, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3
(1982). Of course, there is a human tendency to equate the general interest with one's own. Ideo-
logues may even more readily identify the community's values with theirs. An adversary system of
lobbying and litigation encourages these tendencies. When officials of corporations and other large
bureaucracies engage in such advocacy on their behalf, organizational and psychological pressures
operate to squeeze out an independent consideration of the general interest.
50. As Frank Michelman has pointed out, however, this is not to say that interest groups eschew
the language of rights. Having their interests protected by a set of statutory entitlements would ensure
that their interests will trump other factors considered by the administrative decisionmaker. See
Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121
U. PA. L. REV. 962, 997-1003 (1973).
51. The deals conception cannot dismiss public interest discourse as mere window dressing. A
deals conception is normatively justified, if at all, by a claim that enforcement of the bargains struck in
a political arena open to all interests is more likely to advance individuals' interests than any alterna-
tive conception of legislation and administration. If the general public accepts and acts on this concep-
tion of the political process, why is "window dressing" needed? If the public does not, then the nor-
mative claim for the deals approach is seriously compromised; the inference is that only certain
players understand the true nature of the game, and accordingly enjoy a decisive advantage in it.
52. See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 132-34 (discussing rational relationship test).
53. Judge Posner's claim that courts are institutionally incapable of this inquiry is not very per-
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B. Indeterminacy
A second and related flaw in the deals approach is the inevitable inde-
terminacy of statutes and regulations. This indeterminacy requires courts
engaged in interpretation of statutes and review of administrative action to
develop and apply suppletive principles incorporating general social values
which the deals approach ignores.
A statute is a curious form of "contract." How does one identify the
parties to it? Those active in the legislative process typically include pri-
vate groups, state and local officials, representatives of the executive
branch, and the legislators themselves. Public opinion hovers hazily in the
background. As the circle of participants and constituencies widens, it be-
comes increasingly difficult to regard the statute as an identifiable deal
negotiated among discrete actors. Verisimilitude can be achieved only at
the price of indeterminacy.
The multiplicity of "parties," compounded by the high costs of legisla-
tive agreement, results in vague or ambiguous statutes. Moreover, most
statutes must guide behavior over a long period of time. Even if ascertain-
able, the contemporaneous "intent" of the "parties" will often give little
aid in determining what content should be given to a statute years later
under new and unforeseen conditions."
In contract law, courts have generated a variety of suppletive principles
to deal with the inevitable problems of vagueness, ambiguity, and unantic-
ipated or unprovided-for cases. These principles, including norms of good
faith and restrictions on overreaching, are a judicial incorporation of ap-
plicable social values.55 Adjudication shapes the otherwise ambiguous
deals made by the parties in accordance with such understandings.
Application of a contractual approach to legislation would necessarily
suasive. He first argues that courts lack the institutional competence to discover the actual origins of a
law, and so must rely on public documents. See Posner, supra note 41, at 272-73. But "public docu-
ments" certainly include testimony by interest groups in legislative hearings; furthermore, courts could
also look at trade association publications and other interest group position papers, newsletters,
speeches, and so forth. While it would not be simple to reconstruct the configuration of interest group
positions with respect to legislation, it is commonly undertaken all the time by historians and seems no
more difficult than many other tasks that courts undertake.
The second reason Judge Posner advances for limiting courts to statutory language and legislative
history is a "normative theory of democratic politics." Id. at 273. Because most voters are relatively
ignorant about the actual background of legislation, judicial interpretations based on such background
would unduly favor well-organized interest groups. This "normative theory," however, appears to be
totally inconsistent with the "deals" approach originally advocated by Judge Posner and still retained
in large part by him, and he fails to explaln why courts do or should embrace it.
54. See G. CALABRES, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 2 (1982). Landes and Pos-
ner also acknowledge the problem of obsolescence and indeterminacy. See Landes & Posner, supra
note 41, at 879.
55. See E. FARNsWORTH, CONTRAcTS 479-501 (1982) (interpretation of vague or ambiguous
terms); id. at 523-25, 526-34 (courts' creation of "implied" terms and duties to deal with omitted
cases); id. at 660-79 (courts' treatment of mistake, impossibility, and frustration).
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involve analogous suppletive principles. Because of the greater likelihood
of ambiguity, vagueness, and unanticipated and unprovided-for cases in
the statutory context, such suppletive principles are correspondingly more
important. In a society such as our own, these principles would necessa-
rily incorporate liberal background understandings of the basic purposes
of regulation. 6
The problems posed for the deals approach by statutory vagueness, am-
biguity, and unanticipated or unprovided-for cases cannot be finessed by
the supposition that the deal involved a delegation of all such questions for
decision by the responsible administrative agency.5 The extent and terms
of any such delegation must be decided by someone. Our consistent ad-
ministrative law practice-presumably part of the background against
which any deal is made-points to the judiciary as the institution to make
this determination. But the deals approach all too often fails to live up to
its promise of providing courts with a determinate, "value-free" basis for
making such determinations.
The FCC's assertion, during the 1960's and 1970's, of power under the
Communications Act of 1934 to regulate cable television as ancillary to its
regulation of over-the-air broadcasters provides an example of this prob-
lem. The statute, enacted when television was in its infancy and long
before the rise of cable technology, authorizes the FCC to regulate broad-
casting in the "public convenience, interests, or necessity . . . ., The
Act's history makes clear that it was not designed to protect existing
broadcasters against competition.59 Shall the court say that the economic
competition between cable and traditional broadcasting nonetheless sup-
ports the Commission's assertion of jurisdiction? Or that the failure to
deal explicitly with new technologies in the 1934 Act excludes it? Or that
the issue should be decided as the 1934 Congress would have done, had it
foreseen it-an inquiry that risks incoherence? Or that it all depends
56. The more firmly established these principles, the more justified courts would be in applying
them, unless there is a clear statement in the relevant statute to negate them. See H. HART & A.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1240-41 (Tent. ed. 1958).
57. Nor can it be made to disappear by extending the doctrine against delegation of legislative
power to require greater statutory specificity. See Stewart, supra note 6, at 1693-97. Dean Ely takes a
different view, believing that courts can successfully force legislatures to enact detailed and specific
statutes. See J. ELY, supra note 2, at 131-34.
58. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1982).
59. See Coase, supra note 34, at 8-9. Coase points out that a principal reason for Congress'
creating a regulatory program to deal with the problem of competition for scarce spectrum space,
rather than awaiting common law development of the property system, was fear that the latter system
would give existing broadcasters vested property rights in the spectrum and prevent changes in spec-
trum allocations in response to changing technologies and social considerations. The perceived need
for flexibility was explicitly reflected in statutory provisions limiting the broadcasting license term to
three years (since enlarged to five) and bravely stating that a license award was not to be construed as
a grant of property rights in the spectrum. See Communications Act of 1934, § 307, ch. 652, 48 Stat.
1083 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1982)).
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upon a particularized assessment of the justifications for, and likely conse-
quences of, the Commission's assertion of jurisdiction? 0 The deals ap-
proach cannot answer these questions; their resolution requires the judi-
cial application of suppletory principles incorporating public values other
than simple bargain-enforcement.
Similar difficulties in applying the deals approach arise with respect to
procedural questions. The largely judge-made doctrines governing inter-
vention in agency proceedings and standing to secure judicial review have
a major impact on regulatory outcomes. When the Communications Act
was passed in 1934, consumers and others not directly subject to regula-
tion could generally not intervene in regulatory agency proceedings or
seek judicial review. Courts have since liberalized the law.61 Ought to-
day's courts, deciding broadcast cases today in which viewer groups seek
intervention in and judicial review of FCC decisions, apply the procedural
law of 1934, on the premise that it was part of the statutory deal? Or
ought they apply the law as subsequently liberalized, on the premise that
continued flexibility was part of the deal?62 The Act itself does
not-indeed, by the logic of self-reference, cannot-resolve the question.
The deals approach, which promises objectivity and predictability, again
provides no guidance.
C. Illiberality
The stark form of the deals conception advanced by Landes and Posner
posits and enforces a vision of a society in which citizens use government
power to prey on one another. Strong and well-organized interests enrich
themselves and impose their sectarian values on the weak and less cohe-
sive. Moreover, the private wealth-redistributing deals that the dominant
interests arrange and the courts enforce as such diminish the economic
welfare of society as a whole.63
Such a bleak ideal of society can only be justified on the basis of a
highly pessimistic view of institutional reason. It assumes that values are
totally arbitrary and subjective, and that government can accordingly do
no more than secure a minimum of stability and wary cooperation by
60. For a sample of judicial efforts to deal with the cable television issue, see FCC v. Midwest
Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 704-07 (1979); United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649,
671-75 (1972). For discussion of the principles applied by the courts in the communications field
generally-principles which include an aversion to private interest deals -see infra pp. 1579-81.
61. See Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the
Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4-5 (1982); Stewart, supra note 6, at 1723-56.
62. The issue is further complicated by provisions in the Communications Act authorizing judicial
review by license applicants or persons "adversely affected" or "aggrieved" by the Commission's deci-
sion. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (1982). See Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC,
359 F.2d 994, 1000-06 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (discussing evolution of standing doctrine).
63. See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 44; G. STIGLER, supra note 19.
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enforcing the mutually self-interested deals that emerge from a political
struggle which serves as the surrogate for violence." It concludes that
judges ought not attempt to promote the just or the good, for in seeking to
impose their own subjective preferences on others they would introduce
destabilizing uncertainty.
A conclusive refutation of this rationale would require a volume of phi-
losophy (or an historical millenium) that has not yet appeared and likely
never will. I limit myself to two claims. First, the deals approach miscon-
ceives the true sources of stability in a social and political order. In the
face of rapid social and economic change, stability cannot be found in a
practice of enforcing whatever deals powerful interest groups may have
struck at some often distant point in the past, even if one could identify
such deals and their contemporaneous import. The effort to enforce such
past deals can, in fact, be highly destabilizing. Given the inertia of the
legislative process, why should subsequent players accept the particular
deals that earlier players happened to strike simply because those deals
came first? The deals thesis ignores this problem and supposes that social
stability can be achieved only by resolving the balance between uncer-
tainty and flexibility entirely in favor of the past's dead hand.65 The ap-
propriate, if inevitably indeterminate, reference points for balance must be
in socially embedded normative frameworks-such as entitlement, wealth-
creation, and non-commodity values-that provide the sources of adaptive
stability in the legal order.
The continuing power of these normative conceptions, illustrated in the
later sections of this Article, gives rise to a second claim. The record of
our society and its jurisprudence indicates that the deals approach takes
too pessimistic a view of institutional reason. The American liberal tradi-
tion has, however imperfectly, advanced individual dignity and promoted
the collective realization of both material and non-commodity values in
ways that transcend what the deals conception can know or admit.
D. The Continuing Relevance of the Deals Approach
Despite these criticisms, the deals approach is not irrelevant to regula-
tory law. The logic of representative democracy requires a large scope for
play among competing social and economic interests in shaping law.
64. See Michelman, Norms and Normatity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1015 (1978).
65. The premise of this argument, like that of Professor Calabresi's, see G. CALABRESI, supra note
54, is the presence of a high degree of inertia in the legislative process. The many techniques, chroni-
cled by Professor Calabresi, used by courts to avoid enforcing outdated statutes may reflect a judgment
that such enforcement would be destabilizing. But a legislative process that instantly enacted contem-
poraneous shifts in public views would also be destabilizing.
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Moreover, political activity can be understood as a form of reciprocal edu-
cation and collective self-determination integral to a more ample form of
liberalism. 6 Ideally, politics involves a dialogue among different public-
regarding visions of liberal policy, rather than a struggle among private-
regarding factions seeking to exploit government power for their own ben-
efit.17 But our situation is not ideal. Although citizens do not equate vot-
ing with shopping, they do perceive and act on the premise that politics is,
to a considerable degree, a struggle among competing factions. For the
most part, courts in an imperfectly ordered democracy cannot sufficiently
distinguish public-regarding from private-regarding legislation in order to
invalidate the latter.66 If Congress enacts into law an interest-group deal
that passes muster under tolerant constitutional norms of public purpose
and neutrality, courts enforce it.
Still, the law's great purpose is to justify and align the exercise of pub-
lic force with public ends. In giving ongoing content to regulatory pro-
grams, courts accordingly proceed as if officials were pursuing public-re-
garding objectives. 9 The deals thesis may contribute to a positive theory
66. See infra pp. 1566-76.
67. For a discussion of John Rawls' concept of a well-ordered society and its implications for the
courts' role, see B. ACKEPMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 5-39 (1977).
68. See supra notes 16-18.
69. See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 133-38 (discussing and explaining Supreme Court decisions).
In carrying out their "as if" enterprise, judges must make assumptions about how likely it is that
the decisions they review will advance public, rather than parochial, private objectives. See B. ACKER-
MAN, supra note 67, at 38. In addition, judges must be careful of undermining the authority of politi-
cal institutions by expropriating their value-defining function. See Michelman, supra note 18, at 508-
10.
Moreover, there is a danger that the enterprise will be injected with hypocrisy, and citizens with
cynicism, if the public objectives imputed to governmental decision are too greatly at variance with the
actual sources and purposes. Rationality review of statutory constitutionality seeks to avoid this dan-
ger by openly admitting the "as if" character of the enterprise, refusing to examine actual motive, and
simply positing the existence of facts which might sustain the statute. Federal administrative law, by
contrast, has developed a "hard look" standard that probes more deeply, insisting that decisions be
justified as comprehensively rational, see Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95
HARV. L. REV. 393, 411-13 (1981), when they may in fact have been based on quite different consid-
erations, self-interested or otherwise. Courts have, however, maintained a veil between appearance
and reality by refusing to force disclosure of off-the-record negotiations and political discussions that
influence regulatory decisionmaking in rulemaking, thereby limiting the rulemaking record to data
and analytical studies. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 396-97 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Finally, when courts proceed as if the participants in the political process and the litigants before
them are bearers of public values, as this Article and my reading of Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of
Erie, supra note 43, suggests that they should, they face a dilemma. To the extent that
courts-whether they are considering principles of constitutional or of administrative law-themselves
seek to determine whether a particular controverted measure is in fact justified by the relevant public
values, they override the civic processes of debate and decision in other fora which generally offer
superior opportunities for the participation and education of citizens. See Michelman, supra note 18,
at 506-10.
To the extent that judges assert the need for public value justifications but in fact exhibit deference
to decisions of other fora-decisions reflecting pressures and considerations that are in some measure
self-interested-they risk generating cynicism. Although they may seek to avoid these problems by
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of why regulatory law emerges and assumes the form that it does. The
terms of the resulting statutes and regulations set bounds, but the deals
conception is not an adequate norm to guide the courts in their work.
III. Regulation Based on Rights
Under an entitlement conception, the extent and content of regulation
are defined by the respective rights of regulated firms ("defendants") and
regulatory beneficiaries ("plaintiffs") .7 The entitlement conception views
regulation as the common law's successor in defining and securing per-
sonal rights. By creating zones of personal thought and action protected
against outside intrusion, such rights make individual choice possible and
are thus a necessary foundation of any liberal jurisprudence, even the
minimalist version represented by the deals thesis.7 1 The conditions of in-
dustrialization, however, sapped the ability of the common law to protect
rights effectively, necessitating the creation of administrative authorities to
assume this task and secure rights to honest commercial dealing, a healthy
environment, and so on.
This account promises a way of reconciling regulation with the liberal
principles of neutrality and avoidance of coerced wealth transfers. If the
common law, regarded as a system of boundary and transactional rules,
successfully promotes decentralized pursuit of plural values, then a regu-
latory version of that system may also pass muster.7 2 But this promise is
at best a limited one.
Some regulatory programs, such as those dealing with race and sex dis-
crimination, can perhaps be accounted for in terms of entitlement concep-
tions.7 1 Organic statutes, by limiting regulatory agencies' powers, may
adopting a Landes-Posner approach, they not only abandon for themselves a conception of society
based on other than self-regarding considerations, but encourage others to do so as well.
70. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1271-72. Administrative agencies might be viewed as
"dominant protective associations" to whom citizens have delegated the enforcement of their rights
because conditions of urban industrialism have made individual enforcement too costly or clumsy. See
R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 15-22, 78-84 (1974).
The original conception of administrative agencies was that they would function as a sort of special-
ized court to redefine and enforce entitlements under industrial conditions. See J. DICKINSON, ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW 10-13 (1927); B. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL EcON-
OMY OF REGULATION 97 (1980).
71. See C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 14, at 100-04.
72. The internal logic of an entitlement system might discipline the input of interest group pres-
sure in such a way as to ensure a regulatory scheme that worked itself pure and satisfied the principle
of neutrality. Hayek portrays common law adjudication as a process that accomplishes this alchemical
transformation. See 1 F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 118-22 (1973). He would, how-
ever, deny that regulatory legislation and administration could achieve a similar transformation. See
id. at 97-98.
73. With the development of antidiscrimination law with respect to race, gender, age, and handi-
caps, however, it has become increasingly clear that neither violations nor remedies can be defined in
terms of individual entitlements. See Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB.
APE. 107 (1976). The effort to integrate a school system or redirect the employment practices of a
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give rise to defensive rights by regulated firms, and statutes sometimes
confer regulatory protection in specific terms that can support affirmative
rights on behalf of regulatory beneficiaries. In a pervasively industrialized
and regulated society, however, most regulatory programs and choices
cannot be defined or implemented in terms of juridical rights. Such rights
are generated by stable, general, categorical and determinate rules and
principles. 4 The probabilistic, collective-good nature of the benefits pro-
vided by regulation and the variability in economic and geographic condi-
tions prevent the development of such rules and principles. Regulation
must, under conditions of relatively rapidly changing social and economic
conditions, influence the behavior of many differently situated actors in
order to provide, in the face of limited resources, protection to many dif-
ferently situated regulatory beneficiaries. This task of management cannot
be reduced to a system of juridical entitlements.
The potential demand for regulatory protection will almost always out-
strip the enforcement and compliance resources that society is willing to
provide for such protection. A system of regulation based on entitlements
would present courts with the Herculean task of "rationing" entitlements
among claimants all of whom can plausibly claim protection.
The problem, however, is not simply a remedial one. Because regula-
tory benefits are collective and probabilistic, determination of the appro-
priate content of regulatory protection is necessarily contingent and arbi-
trary-characteristics incompatible with a system of rights.75 In regulating
large enterprise has come to resemble the complex allocative management tasks involved in regulation.
See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
74. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1242.
75. Richard Epstein has argued that the content of common law obligations and privileges can be
derived from a deontological system of moral rights and duties, and that "utilitarian" considerations
play a role only at the remedial stage. See Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilita-
rian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 78-79 (1979); Epstein, The Principles of Environmental
Protection: The Case of Superfund, 2 CATO J. 9 (1982). Under such an approach, administrative
agencies might be regarded simply as utilitarian remedial devices to elaborate and enforce standards of
conduct whose content could be determined by common-law-like juridical conceptions of entitlement.
This position is, however, untenable, for the reasons developed in the text.
The common law developed in an era in which the interactions among individuals were less com-
plex. Technology was far less developed. Moreover, scientific knowledge concerning the more subtle
or complex health and environmental effects of activities was primitive. In these circumstances, satis-
factory adjustments could often be achieved through relatively clear-cut, widely-applicable "boundary
crossing" rules, such as those of trespass. Even where a more particularized assessment was neces-
sary-as in many cases of nuisance-the situations involved were relatively limited and simple.
Today, the legal system must cope with thousands of different activities and tens of thousands of
different chemicals that pose different, difficult to identify, risks to health and the environment Be-
cause of limits in knowledge and a variety of practical difficulties, it is not feasible to establish a
universal risk exposure standard-a modern-day equivalent of a trespass rule-that could serve as the
basis for regulating all substances and activities generating such risks. (Even if one could be estab-
lished, its precise content would be arbitrary.) Accordingly, regulation must proceed through
thousands of different standards or other measures to cope with each of these sources of risk.
Analogous difficulties affect common law efforts to deal with problems such as pollution under
contemporary conditions. Damages-the classic common law remedy for violations of rights-are
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oil exploration and production on outer continental shelf lands, for exam-
ple, the government must decide which lands should be developed under
what environmental safeguards. An initial problem is defining the class or
classes of persons with rights to regulatory protection: Those that fish af-
fected waters? Coastal property owners? Users of public beaches? Owners
of tourist businesses? A second problem is the appropriate level of protec-
tion. If, as is typically the case, society is not prepared to eliminate all risk
of harm to all potential beneficiaries, how should the content of their re-
spective entitlements be defined? How does one choose, on entitlement
grounds, between a measure that yields a .0005% annual probability of a
major spill and one that yields a .0003% probability? Not only the ex-
pected level of risk but also its distribution affect the calculus. Decisions
as to the timing, location, and conduct of regulated activities will create
different patterns of risk that expose different individuals to different
threats. Should we permit development of lands near the shore, threaten-
ing shore activities, or lands that are further offshore but closer to rich
fish-spawning grounds like the Georges Bank? The problem of arbitrari-
ness in the definition of rights is pervasive. 7' Even if a set of non-arbitrary
entitlements to regulatory protection could initially be established, the
content and structure of such entitlements would have to be constantly
adjusted in response to changing economic and social conditions in order
to maintain the specific relations that rights require.77 Such a kaleidoscop-
ically shifting set of arrangements can hardly qualify as a system of rights.
often not an appropriate or workable remedy because harms are collective and often consist of individ-
ually small, but, in the aggregate, potentially significant risks of ecological or health harm at some
uncertain point in the future. In these circumstances, injunctive remedies are often necessary to pro-
vide effective relief. Injunctive remedies, however, present most or all of the difficulties discussed in
the text with respect to administrative regulation.
76. The example of environmental regulation used in the text consists of general regulations spec-
ifying permitted conduct. The essential point would be the same when regulation takes the form of
case-by-case screening of particular products or facilities in accordance with general criteria such as
"unreasonable risk." This type of regulation occurs in the licensing of new drugs or the siting of
power plants.
Similar problems arise in broadcast regulation in the context of asserted rights to diverse program-
ming. See infra pp. 1581-82. For a discussion of the concept of program diversity, see R. CASS,
REVOLUTION IN THE WASTELAND, VALUE AND DIVERSITY IN TELEVISION (1981); H. LEVIN, FACT
AND FANCY IN TELEVISION REGULATION (1980).
The fact that the content of regulatory programs cannot be defined by reference to entitlements does
not exclude the possibility that regulatory requirements whose content is determined on other grounds
might be enforceable as rights through, for example, a citizen suit provision. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604
(1982) (Clean Air Act citizen suits). Nor does it exclude the possibility that one might have a right, in
the sense of a moral claim, to freedom from certain types of environmental harms. Such a claim might
be grounded on various moral theories, including deontological, utilitarian, or wealth-maximizing
ones. The burden of the argument here is that such a claim could not be realized in the form of
relatively stable, general, categorical, and determinate juridical rules and principles.
77. In contrast to command and control regulation, which mandates specific conduct by those
regulated, the combination of contract, property, and tort principles in the common law may be re-
garded as a set of transactional ground rules allowing private actors considerable flexibility in mutu-
ally ordering their affairs. Such a framework could better accommodate change without constant, far-
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These difficulties in constructing a system of entitlements on behalf of
"plaintiff" regulatory beneficiaries are mirrored by parallel difficulties in
defining the correlative rights of the regulated "defendants." The defini-
tion of such rights is inevitably arbitrary. In a pervasively regulated econ-
omy, common law property rights can no longer serve as a yardstick to
mark the permissible limits of regulatory intervention. Nor are statutes
likely to fix the precise bounds and contents of agency regulatory power.
How much in the way of less popular, and therefore less profitable,
local and community service broadcaster programming may the FCC re-
quire? What are the limits of the Interior Department's authority to re-
quire OCS rig operators to spend money to reduce the risk of oil spills?
These questions must be answered through a complex allocational process
that weighs the benefits and costs of various alternatives and the agency
resources available to implement them. In order to prevent competitive
distortions and husband scarce compliance resources, an agency must con-
sider the distribution of regulatory burdens among different firms. More-
over, these firms are subject to other regulations, administered by other
agencies. The ultimate task of administrative management must thus cope
simultaneously with at least four interactive factors: limited agency re-
sources for discharging multiple tasks; different potential beneficiaries;
different regulated actors who compete with one another to a greater or
lesser degree; and limited societal resources for reducing multiple risks.
Any one of these dimensions alone could justify the label "polycentric." In
these circumstances, the notion of a juridical right to environmental quali-
ty or broadcast diversity is simply a non-starter.
This conclusion has an institutional aspect. The characteristics of our
courts-case-by-case resolution by an impartial judge of disputes, initiated
by adversary litigants, on the basis of the evidence and claims which they
present-is equipped for deciding bipolar cases by reference to entitle-
ments. But these various characteristics make it unlikely that courts can
successfully carry out the allocational tasks involved in regulatory
management.7 8
reaching revision of the legal principles themselves.
78. The institutional limitations of courts are reflected in efforts to apply adjudicatory procedures
to regulatory tasks such as broadcast license allocation, see Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175
F.2d 351, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1949), or power plant siting, see Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC,
453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972). Experience has shown that proce-
dures developed to decide disputes over entitlements are ill suited for the quite different type of deci-
sions that must be made in regulatory administration. See Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75
YALE L.J. 1227 (1966). The dysfunctional consequences of efforts to reduce "mass justice" welfare
administration to a juridical system of rights are discussed in J. MASHAW, supra note 3; P. NONET,
ADMINISTRATIVE JUTIMCE (1969).
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IV. Regulation Based on Wealth Maximization
Wealth maximization provides another possible foundation for regula-
tory law choices in a liberal state. The goal of wealth maximization is to
produce the greatest output of goods, services, and amenities, as measured
by the aggregate economic value that individuals place on such
commodities."
Such a goal may seem to provide an appropriate framework for the
complex allocational tasks that modem regulation typically in-
volves-tasks that cannot be reduced to a question of entitlement. Wealth
maximization also appears at first glance to reconcile regulation with the
public-interest and neutrality tenets of liberalism. In the current era of
heightened regulatory turmoil, the apparent neutrality of the wealth-
maximizing principle is a great attraction. It promises conscientious and
perplexed regulators an even-handed, welfare-enhancing solution to con-
troversial policy choices.80 Wealth-maximization seems neutral because it
defines value as an aggregate function of each individual's preferences; it
does not single out the preferences of some particular individuals or
groups and give them controlling weight. In addition, regulation designed
to achieve output maximization cannot readily be condemned as a system
of coerced wealth transfers; output maximization is a collective measure of
welfare in which the interests of all citizens "count."' '
These features of the wealth-maximizing principle-together with its
power as a tool for assessing the performance of regulatory pro-
gramsS'-help explain its considerable appeal for policy analysts and reg-
79. The economic value which an individual places on a commodity, opportunity, or amenity may
be defined either in terms of his bid price, or willingness to pay to enjoy it (which assumes that he
does not have a prior entitlement to it), or in terms of his asking price, or the price that he would
accept to part with it (which assumes that he does have a prior entitlement to it). This distinction,
which has potentially significant distributional and allocational implications, underlines the necessity
of some background set of entitlements upon which the efficiency calculus can rest. See Kennedy,
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Programs: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 401-21 (1981).
Another set of difficulties arises from the selection of rules for aggregating or summing the economic
values placed by individuals on outcomes. See A. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL WEL.
FARE (1970). Additional problems are created if the overall distribution of benefits must satisfy some
distributional requirement or constraint. See R. TRESCH, PUBLIC FINANCE: A NORMATIVE THEORY
541-55 (1981).
80. See Remarks of Christopher DeMuth, Associate Director of Office of Management and
Budget, in 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1574, 1574-75 (Jan. 14, 1983).
No one supposes that cost-benefit analysis determines regulatory outcomes even in those agencies
that use it most extensively. Political and bureaucratic factors are of great importance. See B. ACKER-
MAN, S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, J. SAWYER, & D. HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRON.
MENTAL QUALITY 165-223 (1974). But such analysis, if widely employed and accepted as legitimate,
is likely to have a pervasive and cumulatively significant role in shaping the terms of debate and
decision.
81. Preferences are, however, weighted in proportion to wealth, a circumstance that may create a
danger that regulatory policies based on wealth-maximization will violate the liberal tenets.
82. See S. BREYER, supra note 1, at 191-96.
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ulatory administrators."' But the principle raises a large number of hotly-
debated methodological and normative issues.8 Because many of these is-
sues have been fully canvassed elsewhere, 5 the discussion here focuses on
three special difficulties in reconciling wealth maximization with liberal
principles.
One difficulty in reconciling wealth maximization with liberal princi-
ples is that all regulation that is not wholly paternalistic8 6 imposes con-
trols on one person's behavior in order to advance the welfare of others.
Because it is normally infeasible to charge each beneficiary with a share
of the costs of providing a collective good that is proportionate to his share
of the benefits, asymmetry in the distribution of benefits and burdens is
inevitable. Such asymmetry is particularly troubling when some citizens
are net losers. Assume, for example, that many citizens have a strong
preference for maintaining pristine wetlands; the economic benefits of re-
stricting wetlands development (as measured, for example, by the summed
willingness-to-pay of wetlands lovers) exceed the opportunity costs of such
restrictions. Regulations are then adopted to restrict wetland development.
Are liberal principles being violated because wetland owners are coerced
in order to promote others' values? 87
There are at least three responses to this situation. First, each regula-
tory measure may be required to pass a test of Pareto superiority: It must
make some citizens better off while making none worse off. In most cases,
this test would require the payment of compensation to losers, an adminis-
tratively difficult task whose costs might often exceed the net welfare gain
83. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981) (mandating cost-benefit analysis by
federal regulatory agencies); E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIs 134-58
(1978) (evaluating cost-benefit analysis).
84. For example, application of the wealth-maximization principle requires a background set of
entitlement rules to determine the starting point from which the gains and losses generated by pro-
posed regulation are to be defined and measured. In a heavily regulated economy, however, neither
the common law nor any other judicial system of property rights provides a workable yardstick. Regu-
lation arose in large part because of the remedial limitations of the common law in dealing with the
widespread spillovers and other market failures associated with industrial market economies. Con-
sider, for example, pollution that creates widespread disamenity and risk of future health harm. Are
we to suppose, in constructing the baseline, that because the common law (let us assume) prevents
such harms de jure, receptors therefore have an entitlement to be free of pollution or do we assume
that polluters have an entitlement to pollute because severe remedial problems result in a de facto
tolerance of such pollution by the common law regime? At the same time, the normative claim of the
regulatory status quo to serve as a starting point is questionable. What starting point should be se-
lected? See Kennedy, supra note 79, at 427-29, for further discussion of this and other methodological
problems in determining the common law baselines against which regulatory interventions are to be
measured.
85. See, e.g., Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485 (1980); A
Response to the Efficiency Symposium, 8 HOFTRA L. REV. 811 (1980).
86. For a brief discussion of the role of paternalism in regulation, see supra note 12.
87. Assume for purposes of discussion that the restriction does not violate any rights of the owners
and is not justified on the ground that it would prevent violations of rights caused by wetlands
development.
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from the regulation. Second, liberal principles might be satisfied whenever
both costs and benefits are widely distributed and there is a substantial
margin of net benefit. An example might be regulatory controls on electric
power plant emissions that produced substantial, widespread health bene-
fits at low cost. Third, a Pareto superiority principle might be applied at
a wholesale rather than a retail level: The public interest tenet of liber-
alism would be violated only when an entire series of regulatory measures
has imposed net losses on some actors."8
A second difficulty in reconciling wealth maximization with liberal ten-
ets is the problem of what, in an economic perspective, may be character-
ized as "moralisms" or "external preferences"-preferences that individu-
als have regarding the behavior of others.8 9 It seems plain that regulation
in the liberal state cannot be based on negative preferences-on the view
that someone else's behavior is inherently unworthy or disgusting and
ought therefore to be stopped. Banning X-rated cable programming on the
ground that it is corrupting, for example, violates the neutrality princi-
ple.9 It follows that pollution or wetlands development cannot be prohib-
ited because citizens believe such activity to be inherently evil, regardless
of any material effects it might have.
Positive external preferences, however, create a more difficult problem.
Suppose that I favor the broadcast of Shakespeare plays on television not
simply because I enjoy them but because I believe that others would be
better off if they watched and came to appreciate Shakespeare. Would
88. See Polinsky, Probabilistic Compensation Criteria, 86 Q.J. ECON. 407, 412-18 (1972); Pos-
ner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 487 (1980). For discussion and criticism of this approach, see Bebchuk, The Pursuit of
a Bigger Pie: Can Everyone Expect a Bigger Slice?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 671 (1980). To implement
such an approach, one would presumably have to rely on wholesale institutional arrangements likely
to produce, in the aggregate, widespread sharing of the wealth increases created by regulation, rather
than a regulation-by-regulation accounting. But how would the efficacy of such arrangements be
tested and assured? See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foun-
dations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1176-81 (1967). Elements of such a
strategy are outlined in Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 70, 89-94 (1977).
89. See Baker, Counting Preferences in Collective Choice Situations, 25 UCLA L. REV. 381
(1978).
90. The government might, however, respond to this charge by denying responsibility for the
external preferences that it enforces, just as it generally denies responsibility for the content of citi-
zens' preferences in regulation based on wealth maximization. If enforcing private citizens' prefer-
ences for clean air does not violate neutrality, why does enforcement of their preference for decorous
behavior by others? Regulation to control automobile air pollution does not, however, entail condem-
nation of the preferences of those who care little for clean air and would prefer faster or more fuel
efficient cars rather than cleaner ones. (Such regulation may make it more difficult or costly for such
persons to satisfy their preferences, but such opportunity costs are inevitable.) Such condemnation,
however, is the inevitable and explicit purpose of the movie ban. Cf. Stewart, supra note 6, at 1739
(doctrines governing standing to secure judicial review reflect liberal view that government should
advance material interests of citizens but may not enforce their ideological views against others).
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regulatory policies designed to implement preferences such as mine violate
liberal tenets?
This issue merges with the question of non-commodity values. Such
values present a third difficulty in reconciling regulation with liberal prin-
ciples. As explained more fully in the following section, a liberal society
should seek to enhance the capacities and opportunities of citizens to ex-
amine critically their existing values, and to expand and enrich the availa-
ble conceptions of the good. This objective requires nurture of the non-
commodity values of aspiration, mutuality, civic virtue, and diversity char-
acteristic of the American associational tradition. Such a conception of lib-
eralism rejects a model of choice-a model that is almost inevitable in a
wealth-maximizing approach-in which persons make a series of discrete
commodity consumption decisions with a view to maximizing, within
budget constraints, satisfaction of their current subjective preference sets.
The incompatibility between wealth maximization and non-commodity
values is made clear by the methodologies devised to measure the economic
value to individuals of collective goods such as environmental quality or
more diverse television programming."1 One technique is to identify and
measure market variables that reflect the value that individuals place on a
collective good. If, for example, individuals value clean air, they would
presumably pay higher prices for housing in areas with clean air. If they
dislike polluted work places, they are likely to demand higher wages for
working in such places. By correlating variations in property values or
wages with variations in air pollution, one can attempt to derive the value
that individuals place on clean air.92 Similarly, one may seek to derive the
value that television viewers attach to program diversity from the amounts
they pay for cable service.9 3
Because this approach has several important theoretical and practical
limitations,94 economists have also devised survey techniques that use in-
91. See COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS & WATER POLLUTION POLICY (H. Peskin & E. Seskin eds.
1975); A. FERGUSON & E. LEVEEN, THE BENEFITS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION (1981); A.
FREEMAN, THE BENEFITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT (1979); H. LEVIN, supra note 76. An-
other approach is to measure the direct cost savings (such as reduced medical costs due to healthier
air) attributable to regulatory benefits; this would presumably be less than willingness to pay for such
benefits, but would establish a lower bound. See L. LAVE & E. SESKIN, AIR POLLUTION AND HUMAN
HEALTH (1977).
92. See, e.g., Bayless, Measuring the Benefits of Air Quality Improvements: A Hedonic Salary
Approach, 9 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 81 (1982). Harrison & Rubinfeld, Hedonic Housing Prices
and the Demand for Clean Air, 5 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 81 (1978).
93. See H. LEVIN, supra note 76.
94. The decisions being measured by the market may themselves be infected by "market failures"
such as inadequate information; individuals, for example, may be ignorant of adverse health effects
associated with air pollution. It may be difficult to isolate the impact of one variable-such as air
pollution-from that of all of the other variables that affect wage rates or property values. Or there
may be no close market analogue or measure of the benefit which a proposed regulation seeks to
provide. For an example of the ingenuity to which economists may be driven in order to cope with
1563
The Yale Law Journal
terviews or simulations to elicit the economic value that an individual
places on a collective benefit." But these techniques also have drawbacks,
such as the difficulties subjects face in assimilating information and mak-
ing decisions with which they have no experience.
All of these techniques attempt to isolate an individual's valuation of a
collective good from the values or actions that others might hold or take
with respect to such a good. In order to screen out strategic behavior and
permit a mathematically tractable summing of values, they seek to elicit
the individual's willingness to pay for the benefits that he receives from a
collective good, considered as an individual commodity chosen and con-
sumed by him alone, with a view to maximizing the sum of individual
demands.96 This approach to choice excludes important non-commodity
values discussed in the following section. Because regulation based solely
on wealth maximization excludes these values, it violates liberal principles
by imposing on citizens a particular and limited conception of the good.
Even if these three theoretical problems were disregarded, the wealth-
maximizing principle is a dubious foundation for administrative law.
Courts are institutionally ill-suited to assess the likely consequences of
regulatory initiatives or to identify their associated costs and benefits.9 7
The problem of benefit measurement is particularly acute because forensic
processes are especially ill-suited for identifying and summing
preferences.98
Consider, for example, judicial review of the question whether the FCC
should impose regulatory restrictions on subscription cable television ser-
vices in order to protect advertiser-supported, over-the-air broadcasting.
Will such restrictions increase wealth? On the one hand, there is a "mar-
ket failure" in advertiser-supported television: It largely fails to respond to
differences in the intensity of preferences that viewers have for various
programs-a defect that subscription television would cure. On the other
hand, subscription television also suffers from a market failure attributa-
ble to the fact that the marginal or incremental cost of supplying addi-
such difficulties, see J. Kalt, The Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulation of Coal Stripmining (Dis-
cussion Paper Series, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Univ., No. E-82-08).
95. See J. GREEN & J. LAFFONT, INCENTIVES IN PUBLIC DECISION-MAKING 3-78 (1978); Brook-
shire, Thayer, Schulze, & d'Arge, Valuing Public Gods: A Comparison of Survey and Hedonic
Approaches, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 165 (1982).
- 96. Surveys of individuals' willingness to pay have been used to value the protection of remote
recreational areas, see Rowe, d'Arge & Brookshire, An Experiment in the Value of Visibility, 7 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1, 1-19 (1980), the air quality in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, see
Brookshire, Experiment in Valuing Public Goods, in ADVANCES IN APPLIED MICROECONOMICS (V.
Smith ed. 1980), and the demand for public television, see Bohm, Estimating Demand for Public
Goods: An Experiment, 3 EUR. ECON. REV. 111-30 (1972).
97. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1275-78.
98. This is one of the underlying reasons why adjudicatory procedures are, as already noted,
poorly suited for many regulatory decisions. See supra note 78.
1564
Vol. 92: 1537, 1983
Regulation in Liberal State
tional consumers approaches zero. Economic logic dictates that viewers be
charged a price equal to marginal costs, but this will not enable the com-
pany to recoup the overhead costs of establishing and running the system.
Charging a price based on average cost to cover these expenses will ex-
clude some viewers who would subscribe if they were charged a price
based on the incremental costs of serving them. This will result in a loss
of potential consumer welfare. 99 Will a mix of subscription cable and ad-
vertiser-supported television be better than either alone? What mix?100
Such a decision, however, is relatively straightforward in comparison to
many environmental regulatory and resource management choices. Con-
sider the decision whether to permit oil development of the outer continen-
tal shelf off northern California. Given the complexity and uncertainty of
the economic, engineering, geological, meteorological, and ecological ques-
tions involved in determining the risks of spills, and given the difficulties
in identifying and summing individuals' preferences for various probabil-
istic environmental benefits, how can a court determine which decision
will advance economic welfare? 01
Courts' institutional shortcomings are reflected in their refusal to apply
a common economic yardstick to regulatory benefits and costs. Courts in-
stead tend to equate economic productivity with the unregulated market,
in juxtaposition to various other values, such as environmental or health
protection, which are to be advanced by regulation.102 In policing the
99. For a general discussion of the problem of pricing commodities whose production is character-
ized by declining marginal costs, see S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULA-
TORY POLICY 445-50 (1978). For specific discussion in the context of broadcasting, see R. NOLL, M.
PECK & J. McGOWAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION (1973).
100. At first glance, more channels might seem preferable because greater competition enhances
consumer welfare. But there are economies of scale in television production and distribution which
may be impaired by an increase in number of channels, leading to a potential loss in consumer wel-
fare. In such circumstances, all consumers might be better off if they jointly agreed to sacrifice their
freedom to "shop" for diverse programs by agreeing to watch a relatively small number of channels in
order to realize the resulting scale economies, that is, in order to see better shows which tend to be
more expensive to produce. But transaction costs would prevent the negotiation of any such agree-
ment. An administrative agency can impose the equivalent of such an agreement by restricting the
number of channels. But, unlike a system of voluntary agreement (if it were available), there is no
reliable way by which the administrator can determine whether such a regulation would enhance
consumer welfare or whether the restriction of competition and choice would involve losses exceeding
whatever gains might be achieved by realizing scale economies.
101. Administrative agencies have a number of institutional advantages over courts in dealing
with such issues. First, agencies are better equipped in terms of resources and procedures to identify,
obtain, and evaluate relevant data and analysis. Second, insofar as the political system operates as a
mechanism to register preferences for collective goods, agencies are more responsive to that mecha-
nism. Third, they can coordinate regulatory decisions that courts deal with in isolation. The conse-
quences and desirability of a particular regulatory proposal can rarely be judged in isolation from
other proposals. For example, the need to develop oil reserves off northern California and the accept-
ability of the risks associated with such development cannot be judged in isolation from a considera-
tion of the other sites at which oil might be developed. See Note, Sales of Public Land: A Problem in
Legislative and Judicial Control of Administrative Action, 96 HARV. L. REV. 927 (1983).
102. See Stewart and Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1241-45.
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boundary separating the unregulated market and regulatory public values,
reviewing courts generally require agencies to identify and discuss the ex-
penditures that regulated firms must make and the competitive disloca-
tions that they will suffer as a result of regulation. Agencies must also
attempt to identify and evaluate the benefits that the regulation will pro-
vide; these benefits are generally defined in non-economic terms, such as
reduced illness. 103
There are major flaws in this approach from the viewpoint of wealth
maximization. On the one hand, compliance outlays and competitive dislo-
cations are a poor measure of the economic costs to society of regula-
tion.1 0 4 On the other, an economically rational calibration of costs and
benefits requires that the benefits of regulation be reduced to economic
terms, by summing the commodity values that individuals would place on
those benefits. This approach, as already noted, errs by ignoring impor-
tant non-commodity objectives of regulation.10 5 But the courts, for institu-
tionally understandable reasons, have committed the opposite error of ig-
noring the economic or commodity dimensions of regulatory benefits. As a
result, there has not been adequate consideration of the respective roles
that commodity and non-commodity objectives should enjoy in regulatory
policy.
V. Non-Commodity Values
This section outlines a theory of non-commodity values which addresses
shortcomings in the various conceptions of regulatory law examined in
previous sections.
Aspiration, diversity, mutuality, and civic virtue are integral to the lib-
eral ideal that individuals choose and realize their own conception of the
good. They enable individuals to appraise critically their existing prefer-
ences and to experience and test different conceptions of the good. Non-
commodity values also encourage individual involvement in necessarily
collective determinations of social and economic conditions. These values,
historically nurtured in the decentralized, associational tradition of Ameri-
can liberalism, must be addressed by the regulatory programs of a devel-
oped national economy. To disregard such values and base regulation ex-
clusively on wealth-maximizing commodity values would violate liberal
principles by dictating to citizens a particular conception of the good.
103. See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981); Industrial Union
Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486
F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
104. See Stewart, supra note 38, at 1259-60, 1288-95.
105. See supra p. 1564.
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A. Ingredients of a More Ample Liberalism
As stated in the introduction to this Article, liberalism has often been
caricatured as a myopic social and political creed that celebrates subjectiv-
ity, egoism, and commodity values. The elements of truth in that attack
stirred concern among nineteenth-century liberals, most notably John Stu-
art Mill. In On Liberty, Mill argued for limits on social and governmen-
tal authority in order to liberate individuals from society's homogenizing
tendencies.10 8 But many of Mill's other writings reflect the conviction that
a purely private conception of liberty could impoverish individual experi-
ence and capacity for self-realization. 10 7 These concerns have been revived
by contemporary scholars who criticize liberal conceptions of law and so-
ciety and the law and economics movement."0 ' There is today fresh inter-
est in developing a more "ample liberalism" that recognizes the need to
develop in individuals a critical capability with respect to their
preferences.109
Such a capability is central to a Pelagian conception of liberalism that
affirms the supreme value of individual self-determination,'1 for without
such a critical capacity one can hardly be said to choose one's own ends.
This conception of liberalism also requires a substantial diversity in the
conceptions of the good accessible to individuals. Such diversity depends
upon heterogeneous social, intellectual, and physical environments. Volun-
tarism also implies opportunity for participation in the collective determi-
nation of social and physical environments that shape both the ends avail-
able to individuals and the means to realize them. These considerations
suggest the following principles as elements of a more ample conception of
106. I have nominated Mill as a representative thinker because he was so fully sensitive to the
internal tensions in any conception of liberalism that was responsive both to the richness of human
experience and aspiration and to the exigencies of modern government. Matthew Arnold and T.H.
Green shared similar concerns. See M. ARNOLD, CULTURE AND ANARCHY (1869); E. ALEXANDER,
MATTHEW ARNOLD AND J.S. MILL (1965); M. RICHTER, THE POLITICS OF CONSCIENCE: T.H.
GREEN AND HIS AGE (1964); cf. K. POLANYj, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 255-56 (1973) (contem-
porary task to maintain values of "moral freedom and independence of mind" fostered by nineteenth-
century economic and legal arrangements in post-market era).
107. See, e.g., J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 94-98 (Everyman ed. 1940) (1st ed. London 1859) (collec-
tive and individual development depends on critical self-examination of prevailing beliefs and values);
Mill, Representative Government, in THREE ESSAYS 167-68, 170, 197 (R. Wollheim ed. 1975) (worth
of government measured by moral and intellectual development of citizens).
108. See, e.g., Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 769; Kelman, Consumption The-
ory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669 (1979); Ken-
nedy, supra note 79.
109. See, e.g., Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Ju-
dicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145 (1977-78); Unger, supra note 2
(ideal of "superliberalism").
110. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 8; J. RAWLS, supra note 9; M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE
LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); Unger, supra note 2.
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liberalism that would have important implications for regulatory
jurisprudence:
Aspiration-The social and physical environment should, consistent
with liberal principles, equip and encourage individuals to examine criti-
cally their existing conceptions of the good. It should also provide oppor-
tunities for individuals to develop and pursue those conceptions which, on
reflection, appear to them more worthy and fulfilling. We may term this
the value of aspiration.
Diversity-A diversity of economic, cultural, and physical environments
should be fostered. A homogeneous society will not provide a setting in
which an individual can readily discover and test divergent conceptions of
the good as part of the process of reflective self-development that the prin-
ciple of aspiration implies."' This diversity can in some respects be pro-
moted by limiting the power of government to dictate or shape individual
preferences, but it may in other respects require collective action. Educa-
tion is one example; environmental regulation is another.
Mutuality- The foundation of a liberal society is respect by each indi-
vidual of every other's right to pursue his own conception of the good. But
respect also implies concern for the adequacy of others' opportunities to
pursue their conceptions of the good. 1 Prima facie, each citizen should
be afforded the material and other ingredients of such opportunities in
order to advance the liberal ideal of society as a joint enterprise for pur-
suit of different forms of excellence. This goal may require that citizens be
provided not only a minimum income or housing, but also access to non-
commodity opportunities that may be created by regulation.
Civic virtue-Liberalism should invite individuals to take an active role
in the direction of collective affairs through participation in voluntary as-
sociations and political activity. Such participation can nurture the senti-
ment of mutuality and diversify individuals' conceptions of the good to
include associational and communal goals.1 3
The decentralized, associational character of American liberalism did
much to promote these four non-commodity values. Decentralization,
combined with geographical, economic, ethnic, and cultural variety, gener-
ated substantial diversity. Civic virtue was promoted by conditions favor-
ing participation in voluntary associations and a variety of local govern-
mental bodies. Mutuality and aspiration were fostered by church groups,
111. See Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judicial
Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 IOWA L. REV. 713,
750-54 (1977).
112. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHT S SERIOUSLY 273 (1977); M. SANDEL, supra note 110, at
61.
113. SeeJ. MILL, Representative Government, in THREE ESSAYS, supra note 107, at 167, 181-82,
186, 190, 197-98.
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farmers' cooperatives, and workers' associations. Because these values are,
for reasons already explained, disregarded by the principle of commodity-
based wealth-maximization, we may appropriately term them non-com-
modity values.
In excluding non-commodity values, wealth-maximization ignores the
intimate and inevitable interdependencies involved in collective choices." 4
It also ignores the powerful effects that such choices exert on individual
preferences when they determine basic features of the physical and social
environment.11 5 By denying that non-commodity values are an appropri-
ate ground of individual and social choices, wealth maximization denies
important and relevant conceptions of the good. Wealth maximization is
not-contrary to initial appearances-consistent with liberal principles. It
is instead a form of tyranny that would impose on individuals a partial,
sectarian conception of the good. Liberal principles demand that regula-
tion cultivate non-commodity values.
B. Non-Commodity Regulation and Liberal Principles
Expanding regulatory objectives to include non-commodity values raises
three related questions. Is regulatory promotion of non-commodity values
itself consistent with liberal principles? What is the appropriate role of
114. The wealth-maximizing approach deliberately seeks to exclude the inevitable interdependen-
des in collective-good decisions. If I am asked how much I alone would pay to reduce air pollution
over the Grand Canyon or toxic wastes in drinking water, my evaluation cannot incorporate collective
considerations. These considerations include the appropriate procedures for deciding issues involving
indivisibilities as well as such questions as whether society should collectively encourage geographi-
cally diverse levels of environmental quality and economic development, or whether it should aspire to
higher levels of health protection than today's calculus of costs and benefits would dictate.
It might be possible, within the context of a commodity cost-benefit model, to elicit individuals'
preference for diverse levels of environmental quality: For example, many might prefer relatively
polluted rivers in industrial areas (because of high clean-up costs and low recreational benefits) and
quite clean streams in pristine areas. See J. DALES, POLLUTION, PRICES AND PUBLIC PoLIcY 51-76
(1967) (discussion of "separate facilities"). But it would be far more problematic to extract an individ-
ual commodity-like preference for living in a society structured to promote diversity. When it excludes
non-commodity values, regulation dictates a partial conception of the good.
115. Regulatory decisions, in contrast to most individual commodity consumption choices, often
determine the social and physical environment in relatively enduring and pervasive ways. This cir-
cumstance makes current preferences a less appealing basis for regulatory decisions, and invites as-
pirational consideration of the values regulation should serve. Commodity choices by market consum-
ers concededly influence their future preferences. With a few exceptions such as drugs and tobacco,
however, government does not attempt to regulate consumers' choices with a view to preference-
formation. This reluctance to intervene reflects several factors: the difficulty in framing a coherent and
workable set of guidelines for intervention, a preference for decentralized approaches, and the fact that
potential "commodity bias" is checked by the existence of flourishing non-market sectors in which
decisions are made collectively and resources mobilized on the basis of non-commodity considerations.
If, however, collective decisions by government were based exclusively on commodity values, the dan-
ger of shaping preferences in an exclusively commodity-consumption direction would become far more
serious. See S. KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES? 27-92 (1981) (discussing ways in which govern-
ment regulatory measures, including choices among various regulatory incentives and sanctions, shape
preferences); Stewart, supra note 6, at 1704-06 (same).
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non-commodity values in regulation? What regulatory measures are best
calculated to promote non-commodity values? I essay a preliminary treat-
ment of these questions.
Governmental measures to promote non-commodity values may be chal-
lenged as inconsistent with liberal principles on the ground that goals such
as "good" programming and pristine environments favor particular, con-
troversial conceptions of the good and advantage selected interest
groups."' If so, one may ask whether the "more ample" form of liber-
alism sketched above is liberalism at all. When regulatory programs are
based neither on rights nor on wealth maximization, they arguably re-
present a selectively weighted conception of the good (with an implicit
condemnation of those who do not endorse it) and the use of government
power to shift wealth in favor of those who share that conception.'11 The
counterargument is that measures which secure non-commodity values
simply enlarge the portfolio of opportunities for citizens to realize their
chosen conceptions of the good. So long as the enlarged portfolio is a cath-
olic one, the principle of neutrality is not violated. That particular inter-
ests may be advantaged or disadvantaged as a result of such measures is
inevitable and incidental. Measures to secure rights have similar effects,
which do not by themselves render such measures illiberal.
The danger that non-commodity regulation may violate liberal princi-
ples varies depending on the particular value in question and on the regu-
latory strategy for securing it. This danger is least grave in the case of
measures designed to secure mutuality. The geographically uniform air
quality standards in the federal Clean Air Act serve mutuality because
they provide the same degree of regulatory protection to all citizens, even
though the cost to society of achieving a given level of air quality is likely
to be higher in more heavily industrialized regions. Uniform standards
might thus be attacked as illiberal on the ground that they transfer wealth
from citizens in less industrialized areas, where control costs are lower, to
those in more industrialized areas.11 But this claim is unpersuasive. Pre-
116. Ronald Dworkin states that most law defining and implementing social, economic, and for-
eign policy cannot be reduced to rights and instead the majority's view of the common good, which
"cannot be neutral." R. DWORKIN, supra note 112, at 205. But he also states that this conception of
the common good must be that of the community as a whole and not that of particular factions. Id. To
the extent that it goes beyond wealth maximization, this conception must not embrace community
ideals that "are controversial" within the community. Id. at 274. Borrowing Dworkin's terminology,
we can ask whether non-commodity values are "controversial" in this sense.
117. Many environmental programs apparently provide disproportionate benefits to the wealthy
and well-educated. See R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 71-73 (2d ed.
1978). Efforts to promote "quality" broadcasting have a similar effect.
118. On the other hand, the benefits of pollution control will be greater in industrialized areas to
the extent that more people live there. But it is improbable in the extreme that geographical variations
in costs and benefits would everywhere balance out so as to make geographically uniform standards
wealth-maximizing.
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sumptively equal enjoyment of collectively provided benefits and opportu-
nities in fact seems more consonant with the liberal principle of neutrality
than a system which denies protection to some simply by virtue of their
residence. One would hardly suppose, for example, that equal levels of
police protection would violate liberal principles simply because the costs
of securing such protection varied geographically." 9
Measures to promote civic virtue also seem relatively invulnerable to
the charge of illiberalism. Indeed, encouraging all citizens to learn about,
and participate in, collective decisionmaking concerning government provi-
sion of collective benefits is calculated to prevent rather than create viola-
tions of liberal principles.12 Encouraging civic participation can hardly be
attacked as a wealth-redistributing imposition that transgresses the re-
quirement that public power be used for the public good. Those who pre-
fer to remain disengaged from politics may claim that such measures vio-
late neutrality. 2 This claim is not compelling: They remain free not to
participate in public affairs.1 2
Regulatory measures aimed at securing diversity and promoting aspira-
tion cause more difficulty. Measures designed to promote diversity usually
subsidize particular preferences for consumption at levels higher than the
market would sustain. The preservation of wilderness areas or classical
music broadcasting formats are examples of such policies. Moreover, it is
often impossible to justify such measures in the name of mutuality as cor-
rections to wealth-dominated inequality of the market, since the prefer-
ences subsidized are often disproportionately those of the relatively afflu-
ent and well educated. These facts give rise to inferences of private wealth
redistribution and perhaps also of implicit condemnation of others'
preferences.
Diversity can be viewed as a cautious or weak form of aspirational
strategy. It provides opportunities and experiences that might not other-
wise be available to individuals. If an individual chooses to avail herself of
these opportunities, she may come to criticize and change her current con-
sumption patterns. An aspirational monopoly, on the other hand, effec-
tively eliminates choice in relevant respects. Consider, for example, a re-
119. The right to a minimum income may be seen as an expression of mutuality in the market
context, where "in kind" mutuality would be administratively costly and seriously wealth-reducing.
120. This is a basic premise of John Ely's "representation-reinforcing" strategy. See J. ELY,
supra note 2, at 73-181.
121. See generally M. WALZER, OBLIGATIONS (1970) (discussing relations between political par-
ticipation and obligation to abide by collective decisions).
122. This claim, however, does become somewhat more persuasive when public resources under-
write such participation. Much of the current controversy over statutory fee awards for public interest
advocacy, see, e.g., Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 U.S. 3274 (1983); Lawyers on the Dole, Wall St.
J., Sept. 8, 1982, at 31, col. 1; OMB's "Wall of Separation" against Tax-Funded Advocacy, REGULA-
TION, Jan./Feb. 1983, at 8, seems to reflect aversion to public funding of ideological advocacy.
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quirement that all television broadcasters show news and documentaries
from 7 to 11 p.m., or air quality regulations that prevent industrial and
commercial development in order to preserve visibility. Because they fore-
close choice, such measures cannot be justified on the "portfolio" argu-
ment that non-market regulation is liberal because it simply expands op-
portunities for individual choice.
Moreover, it cannot be assumed that regulation is always a necessary or
appropriate means of promoting non-commodity values. As discussed be-
low, experience shows that some regulatory efforts-such as the FCC's
promotion of local broadcasting in the name of civic virtue or protection of
existing broadcasters in the name of quality programming-have actually
stifled non-commodity values.
On the other hand, market arrangements are not always inimical to
non-commodity values. By decentralizing economic decisions, promoting
voluntary ordering, and responding flexibly to diverse preferences, market
arrangements can help secure important non-commodity values."" Even
when government does intervene, there are options other than regulatory
controls. For example, government may elect to stimulate certain forms of
private associational activity in order to promote non-commodity values.
The provisions of the Internal Revenue Code which exempt many volun-
tary associations from taxation and allow tax deductions for contributions
to them 125 have probably done more to advance non-commodity values
than a slew of federal regulatory programs.
Conflict between non-commodity values and liberal principles is per-
haps most acute where no serious economic market failure exists, and reg-
ulation is undertaken solely to promote non-commodity values. Consider,
for example, an aspirational ban on snack foods or a compulsory adult
education law.1 26 Such situations do not involve indivisibilities that man-
date a uniform regime. Nor does the asserted commodity bias of the mar-
ket provide a compelling justification for such measures. 127 The suppres-
123. Attempts to justify such measures as an "education" -which those who are forced to undergo
will later come to endorse-seem little better than a rationalization of paternalism infused with con-
demnation of the values of those who do not share the aspiration.
124. See I. KIRZNER, PERCEPTION, OPPORTrNITY AND PROFIT 225-28 (1979).
125. I.R.C. § 501 (1982).
126. While such measures might conceivably be justified on a variety of market failure grounds,
see Kennedy, supra note 12, at 596-604 (discussing how almost any regulatory measure might be
rationalized as correcting market failures), the analysis in the text proceeds on the more realistic
premise that they cannot.
127. Market arrangements are themselves structured by legal rules that will embody some mix-
ture of conceptions of rights, commodity values, and non-commodity values. CF Kennedy, supra note
12, at 596-614 (compulsory rules are chosen to promote efficiency). Accordingly, the appraisal of
alternative market and regulatory regimes from the viewpoint of non-commodity values must consider
the extent to which market arrangements are already structured by legal rules embodying non-
commodity values.
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sion of individual choice and association that such aspirational regulation
entails is likely to be a greater threat to liberal principles than any bias in
favor of market values that a failure to regulate may generate.12 As this
example shows, neutrality is a complex idea that counsels a pragmatic
appraisal of and balance among different regimes of choice and
ordering. 12
9
The case for cultivating non-commodity values through regulation is far
stronger when serious economic market failures exist. Natural monopo-
lies, environmental spillovers, and highly imperfect information represent
market failures precisely because they disable individual or associational
choice. 30 Accordingly, the strongest cases for regulation on wealth-maxi-
mizing grounds are often also those where the liberal virtues of private
ordering would be weakly served by not regulating. Such situations typi-
cally involve indivisibilities that require a collective solution. One cannot,
for example, have at the same time in the same air basin lax standards
that permit industrial development and stringent standards that protect
scenic values and associated lifestyles. Using a wealth-maximizing ap-
proach to resolve this choice unjustifiably excludes non-commodity values.
Imposing stringent standards in the name of aspiration or diversity risks
offending liberal principles for other reasons. A choice must nonetheless
be made. In such circumstances what is needed are strategies that secure
non-commodity values while providing the widest possible scope for de-
centralized initiative and choice. Examples of such strategies include the
following:
Diversity rather than policy monopoly-The dangers of illiberalism are
much reduced by strategies that leave citizens free to choose among several
alternatives generated by different systems of collective choice. For exam-
ple, an FCC requirement that all stations broadcast Shakespeare in prime
time is more vulnerable to a charge of illiberalism than assignment of a
single channel to a public television network that carries Shakespeare.
Decentralization as a preferred strategy-Regulation that promotes de-
centralization of collective decisionmaking reduces the danger of illiberal-
ism."' Decentralization that generates diversity through experimental va-
128. Moreover, less restrictive alternatives such as governmental provision of information or tax
subsidies for education are typically available. For discussion of the limits of "aspirational" goals in
environmental regulation, see Henderson & Pearson, Implementing Federal Environmental Policies:
The Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1429 (1978).
129. C A. HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS: PRIVATE INTEREST AND PUBLIC ACTION 132-
34 (1982) (frustration of individual preferences causes swings between market-based and government
regimes, but balance is needed).
130. Such market failures cause widespread but individually small harms. Individuals will typi-
cally not find it worthwhile to redress such grievances, either by litigation or by bargaining, and
transaction costs impede associational efforts at redress.
131. T. Schelling, Analytical Methods and the Ethics of Policy 20 (Harvard Inst. Econ. Research
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riation is presumptively preferable to centralized dictation of a particular
pattern of diversity. Under a decentralized approach, the mobility of citi-
zens and of capital also provides a safeguard against aspirational over-
reaching."3 2 Accordingly, the FCC may better promote diverse television
programming and civic virtue by providing for local regulation of cable
television than by central regulation of over-the-air broadcasters who are
protected from cable competition.
Public funding rather than "taxation by regulation"--Governments can
also reduce the dangers of illiberality by financing legislative programs
that promote non-commodity values through the public fisc rather than by
establishing regulatory measures that place the entire burden on those
subject to regulation. Those subjected to regulations substantially prohibit-
ing economic development of wetlands, for example, might plausibly claim
to be victims of a coerced private wealth transfer in favor of environmen-
talists. Alternatively, they might claim that the regulations violate the neu-
trality principle, by conscripting them into the service of an environmental
ideology which they reject. 183 This claim is strengthened to the extent that
the responsible administrative agency is seen as an environmental advo-
cate. On the other hand, the claim is much weaker when the regulations
provide for compensation. Under such a system, the potential "victims"
are taxpayers equipped to prevent violations of liberal tenets through the
political process' assessment of competing claims to public resources.
134
Discussion Paper No. 792) (1980), notes the danger of paternalism in decisions by the federal
government:
It is characteristic of policy makers, especially at the level of federal government in a nation
of 200 million, that they are usually making decisions that affect others, not themselves. Hurri-
cane and tornado warnings are for people who live where the hurricanes and tornados strike;
mine safety is a responsibility of legislators and public officials in offices aboveground concern-
ing the lives of people "out there" who work underground. Policies toward the senile, the
comatose, the paralyzed and the terminally ill are deliberated by people who are none of the
above. Occasionally the legislator debating a 55 mile speed limit pauses to think whether the
benefits in safety to his own family will be worth the added driving time, but if he or she is
conscientious that personal calculation may be surreptitious.
The situation must be different when a very small ommunity considers a mobile cardiac
unit or a new fire truck. The question then is not what we ought to spend to save someone
else's life but what we can afford to make our lives safer.
Schelling goes on to suggest that the shift of the choice situation from one that is "other-regarding" to
one that is "collectively-self-regarding," id. at 21, may promote the use of economic tradeoffs between
the benefits and costs of regulation unencumbered by paternalistic inhibitions, although he notes that
it may facilitate consideration of other normative concerns as well.
132. The value of state experimentation was celebrated by Justice Brandeis, who argued against
using the due process clause to restrict state regulatory schemes. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
A recent theoretical analysis of state officials' incentives for innovation, Rose-Ackerman, Risk-
Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980), is
skeptical about the potential for such innovation.
133. Again, assume that the decision to regulate wetlands development violates no rights.
134. Perhaps regulation is justified not by correcting market failures or promoting non-commodity
values, but by securing rights to a minimum income or in-kind benefit. See Kronman, Contract Law
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Analysis of costs and benefits-It would mock the very notion of non-
commodity values to tie the extent of their implementation to the market
measure of individual willingness to pay for them.1"5 But a kind of "ap-
ples and oranges" analysis could seek to measure the economic costs of
policy alternatives and the extent to which they would promote or under-
mine non-commodity values. Such an analysis-which most regulatory
programs conspicuously lack-would not only help identify the most cost-
effective implementation strategies, but also promote a more informed
judgment whether effort to implement the value in question is desirable.
These various strategies are not panaceas. Aspirational measures-such
as Shakespeare on public television-that leave other options open to citi-
zens may not be very effective in influencing individuals to reassess their
preferences. Many people may not bother to tune in Shakespeare on pub-
lic television when network entertainment alternatives are readily availa-
ble. Decentralizing collective decisionmaking may not promote diversity.
Given a national market, capital mobility, and transboundary spillovers,
total decentralization of pollution control policies to the states may result
in relatively uniform, relatively low levels of environmental protection.
Accordingly, centralized measures may be necessary despite their hazards.
Some may find the conflicts and tensions between non-commodity regu-
lation and liberal values evidence of inherent and perhaps fatal "contra-
dictions" in liberalism. They are, however, more properly understood as
reflecting fidelity to the necessary complexities in the idea of an industrial
society that affirms individual and associational pursuit of diverse ends.
Antiseptic neutrality among competing visions of the good is impossible in
cases of collective choice, and collective choices are inevitable in cases in-
volving indivisibilities.1" 6 A society that seeks to nurture diverse forms of
and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 499 (1980) (redistribution through regulation of contrac-
tual terms). Economists have criticized reliance on regulation to achieve distributional objectives on
the ground that tax measures can achieve those objectives without the reduction in aggregate economic
welfare that regulatory measures involve. See R. ZEKHAUSER, USING THE WRONG TOOL: THE PUR-
SUIT OF REDISTRIBUTION THROUGH REGULATION (1979). I do not wish to argue that issue here.
Liberal principles cannot rule out regulation designed to secure rights to a minimum income or to
particular commodities or opportunities. It is, however, quite likely to be difficult to justify particular
regulatory measures on such grounds. Ensuring a minimum overall level of income or wealth for all
citizens is far better accomplished through taxes and cash income transfers than through a series of
disparate and poorly coordinated regulatory measures. See Stewart, supra note 6, at 1707. Moreover,
it will rarely be feasible to specify a right to particular regulatory protections or opportunities. See
supra pp. 1556-68. Finally, experience suggests that regulatory programs with distributional objec-
tives, such as regulation of entry and prices in interstate trucking to ensure "fair shares," can readily
be transformed into a form of private wealth redistribution that is far less visible politically than
taxation and spending decisions. Accordingly, proposals to secure distributional objectives through
regulation rather than taxation should be disfavored.
135. See supra note 114.
136. Any choice among legal rules, including choices about how to allocate decisionmaking com-
petence among various private and political decisionmakers, involves such indivisibilities, see Tribe,
supra note 17, at 11.
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excellence must struggle to promote non-commodity values while main-
taining a large scope for individual and associational initiative. A more
ample liberalism-one that accommodates non-commodity values-does
not pretend to have formulaic answers to the complexities inherent in this
enterprise. And that is precisely one of its virtues.
VI. The Existing and Future Role of Non-Commodity Values in Regu-
latory Law
This section builds upon the general framework developed in the previ-
ous section to analyze environmental and broadcast regulation. It also con-
siders the implications of non-commodity values for administrative law.
A. Non-Commodity Values in Existing Regulatory Programs
Non-commodity values play an important role in existing regulatory
programs. Environmental and broadcast law illustrate how explicit recog-
nition of non-commodity values and their distinctive characteristics can
help explain many otherwise puzzling features of regulatory programs.
They also illustrate some of the hazards in pursuing non-commodity val-
ues through centralized regulation.
Non-commodity values are reflected in such diverse regulatory policies
as wilderness preservation, "technology-forcing" pollution control mea-
sures, environmental standards based solely on health considerations, and
FCC efforts to promote "good" programming. Regulatory programs that
mandate pristine and healthful environments or commercially unpopular
forms of broadcasting are generally not wealth maximizing. 1 7 There is,
for example, no apparent reason why a private market in wilderness ex-
periences could not function adequately to maximize wealth.1"8 Govern-
mental management and regulation to promote preservation can best be
137. An economic analysis based on market failure might dictate some "technology forcing" envi-
ronmental measures, on the theory that inducing innovation in control technologies is cost effective.
See Stewart, supra note 38. It might also dictate some "free" over-the-air broadcast regulation because
of the market failure associated with advertising sponsorship, see supra p. 1565. But it is extremely
implausible that such a calculus could justify the prevailing rigor and extent of such regulation, or
that it could serve at all as a justification for wilderness preservation or health-based environmental
standards.
138. There is, for example, no apparent reason why private entrepreneurs could not satisfy "op-
tion demand"-the demand for the future opportunity to visit scenic areas-through a futures market.
Another asserted justification for government ownership or regulation of natural resources-the pres-
ervation of scenic environments for future generations-is similarly uncompelling. Insofar as this de-
sire runs only to one's direct descendants, a private market system could accommodate it. A private
market system cannot satisfy a collective interest in preservation of wilderness areas for future socie-
ties, but the desire to preserve resources in such a specific form must be explained by non-market
values of diversity or aspiration.
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understood as an effort to support and encourage a preference for non-
commodity experiences such as contemplation.""
Diversity is a slightly weaker means of promoting non-commodity val-
ues because it fosters a variety of conditions and opportunities without
endorsing any particular one. Federal air quality standards140 are an ex-
ample of aspiration because they seek to achieve the same level of air
quality, based solely on health considerations, throughout the nation. The
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and visibility-protection provi-
sions, sharply limiting development in certain pristine areas,141 are an ex-
ample of diversity.1 41 Other diversity measures include governmental ef-
forts to generate more diverse sources and kinds of programming in prime
viewing time,1 43 to restrict joint ownership of media, 14  and to promote
public television.
Environmental and broadcast policy afford several examples of policies
promoting mutuality, which is a distributional aspect of non-commodity
values.145 The government could sell off the public lands, eliminate pres-
ervation regulation, and thus permit the private market to supply wilder-
ness experiences. Although this alternative might increase commodity
wealth, the government has not adopted it, due in part to the belief that
non-commodity opportunities like wilderness experiences should be avail-
able to citizens without regard to wealth. Another example of mutuality is
the geographically uniform, health-based standards characteristic of many
environmental programs. Such uniformity is economically irrational. The
economic benefits of control in less populated areas are typically lower
than in more populated ones, and therefore a wealth-maximizing ap-
proach would generally dictate higher permitted levels of pollution or ra-
diation in less populous areas.1 4 Such a policy would, however, provide
139. See J. SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS (1980).
140. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7402(a) (1982).
141. See id. §§ 7470-7491.
142. The line between "strong" aspiration and "weak" diversity is not always dear, and depends
on the definition of the class of "consumers" of the collective good being provided. For example, a
Prevention of Significant Deterioration strategy may represent a diversity measure from the viewpoint
of residents of the United States, but an aspirational measure from the viewpoint of residents of the
areas where development is constrained. Aspirationa measures may vary in their degree of "coercive-
ness," which might be measured by the elasticity of demand for the affected good. Nationally uniform
health-based environmental quality standards are quite coercive because an individual with a prefer-
ence for lower environmental quality and higher levels of economic development would have to leave
the country in order to satisfy that preference. A requirement that all broadcasters show documenta-
ries during a given hour of prime time is less coercive because a viewer who prefers light entertain-
ment can view at other times, use a video recorder to play light entertainment during that hour, go to
the movies, and so forth.
143. See D. GINSBURG, REGULATION OF BROADCASTING 258-93 (1979).
144. See id. at 195-243.
145. See generally G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 33 (1978) (society may wish to
prohibit Pareto-superior move if wealth distribution is extremely uneven).
146. The costs of achieving a given level of environmental quality will also vary geographically,
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less protection to individuals living in small towns and rural
communities." 7
Civic virtue most clearly reflects the associational elements in the Amer-
ican liberal tradition. The FCC's efforts to promote the local ownership of
broadcasting stations, the local origination of news, public affairs, and en-
tertainment programming, and the use of survey procedures to ascertain
local community interests and needs seek to foster citizen participation in
community government and affairs. Such participation is a strong form of
civic virtue.
The activities of national public interest advocacy groups embody a
weaker form of civic virtue. These groups participate in federal agency
proceedings and litigation. They provide their members and contributors
with a measure of associational participation, though normally of an im-
personal sort, in the development of public policy. Statutory provisions
designed to encourage these activities-including section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code,1 48 public participation requirements, 49 and attor-
ney fee award provisions 50-promote this form of civic virtue.
B. The Performance of Non-Commodity Regulatory Programs
Some regulatory programs have been quite successful in promoting
non-commodity values. The protection of pristine scenic areas in the name
of diversity, through Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) provi-
sions in the Clean Air Act, is an example. Certainly, market forces cannot
depending on the degree and type of industrial, commercial, and residential development in an area,
the area's topography and weather, and so on. It would be unlikely that costs and benefits would
balance each other so precisely as to make geographically uniform standards economically efficient.
The prevalence of geographically uniform federal standards also partially reflects administrative and
political obstacles to agreement on non-uniform standards. See Zerbe, Optimal Environmental Juris-
&ctions, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 193, 210-12 (1974).
147. The value of mutuality is not absolute. The goal of providing equal environmental health
protection to all citizens has been qualified in order to take into account the varying costs and burdens
of control in different geographical areas and industries. For example, the Clean Air Act establishes
geographically uniform air quality standards, but the higher costs of meeting those standards in heav-
ily polluted areas are accommodated by postponing the compliance deadlines for such areas. See R.
STEWART & J. KRIER, supra note 117, at 494-97. In the case of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act, standards concerning toxic substances must be set to ensure that "no employee will suffer mate-
rial impairment of health or functional capacity," but this objective is to be implemented only "to the
extent feasible." 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1982). In practice, feasibility varies from industry to industry
depending on available control technologies, the costs of such technologies, and the ability of an indus-
try to absorb such costs.
148. The Code exempts qualifying nonprofit "religious, charitable, scientific ... or educational"
institutions from federal income tax and makes individual and corporate contributions to such organi-
zations tax-deductible. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982). Subject to certain limitations, these organizations
may engage in lobbying and litigation and participate in administrative proceedings in order to influ-
ence public policy. See id. § 501(h).
149. See Stewart, supra note 6, at 1748-59.
150. See generally S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 99, at 1044-58 (discussing attorney fees
for litigation successfully challenging agency action).
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be relied upon to preserve such areas; 51 government measures like the
PSD program have a clear logic and enjoy widespread public support.1 51
Other programs have failed due to faulty design or the use of inappro-
priate incentives. The "technology forcing" efforts of the Clean Air Act 5"
are an example. The logic of such efforts is in large part aspirational:
Society should seek to achieve healthier and purer air than a wealth-
maximizing calculus based on current preferences would dictate. 15 The
Act's regulatory mandates were designed to force polluting industries to
develop new technologies in order to achieve that goal. The technology-
forcing effort largely failed, however, because the design of the program
did not link technology-forcing measures with ultimate environmental
objectives. 55 Also, the program erred in relying on clumsy and relatively
ineffective command-and-control orders to spur innovation, rather than
economic incentives.' 5
6
In other cases, failure is attributable to basic flaws in the program's
goals. For example, the means employed under the Clean Air Act to re-
strict drastically the private use of automobiles in polluted central cities
included restricting access, eliminating parking spaces, and similar mea-
sures. The stated objective of the regulation was to achieve air quality
goals rapidly. The measures in question were socially costly and of doubt-
ful efficacy.' 57 Moreover, some government officials and environmentalist
lawyers seem to have forced such controls with the apparent goal of re-
ducing use of automobiles and promoting mass transit for reasons other
than improving air quality. No hard-headed assessment was made of pre-
cisely what other objectives, including non-commodity values, would real-
istically be served by measures that were massively inpopular and never
fully implemented.
The experience in broadcast regulation also presents a mixed record.
The limited number of television outlets, and the failure of advertiser-
151. See Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (protection of
redwoods from destruction by logging operations). For subsequent developments in the case, see 398
F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975), 424 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
152. The PSD provisions in the Clean Air Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, §§ 160-169, 91 Stat.
731 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7470 (1982)), represent Congress' endorsement of judicially-developed
standards. Sce R. STEWART & J. KRIER, supra note 117, at 476-94. Although imperfect in certain
respects-they are overbroad in coverage and impose quite cumbersome new source review proce-
dures-they have thus far withstood development-oriented efforts to weaken them substantially.
153. See La Pierre, Technology Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA
L. REV. 771 (1977).
154. See Henderson & Pearson, Implementing Federal Environmental Policies: The Limits of
Aspirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1429, 1443 (1978).
155. See B. ACKERIAN & W. HASSLER, supra note 46.
156. See Stewart, supra note 38, at 1296-1311.
157. See Chernow, Implementing the Clean Air Act in Los Angeles: The Duty to Achieve the
Impossible, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 537 (1975); Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Federalism Problems in
Implementing National Environmental Policies, 86 YALE L.J. 1202-10 (1977).
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supported broadcasting to respond to viewers' intensity of preferences for
various types of programs, could justify regulation promoting program va-
riety on wealth-maximizing grounds alone."' 8 When non-commodity val-
ues such as diversity and civic virtue are considered, the case for regula-
tion seems even stronger. For over 30 years, the FCC, with considerable
judicial prodding, has instituted a wide variety of program measures to
promote such values. Even in their prime, such efforts were widely con-
demned by critics as ineffective. Today, the FCC, with the administra-
tion's encouragement and Congress' acquiescence, is abandoning most of
those efforts in the name of deregulation. What explains this apparent
failure?
Certainly, there have been failures of design. The effort to promote lo-
cal broadcasting by geographical dispersion of stations flew in the face of
scale economies in broadcasting. It aggravated the scarcity problem by
generating only three networks; alternative allocations could have gener-
ated six or seven.159 The efforts to promote local program origination and
non-network prime time programming similarly foundered on the realities
of broadcast economics.' 60
Whether these failures of design were foreseeable, and therefore avoida-
ble, is debatable. It is clear, however, that the FCC persisted in such ef-
forts after their failure became apparent. Such inertia is attributable to
bureaucratic tunnel vision and the interest of those who benefit from pre-
vailing regulatory policies. For example, a reallocation of broadcast sta-
tions to permit the development of more networks would be bitterly op-
posed by the existing networks and by localities that would lose stations.
Regulatory inertia has also hindered the market development of new
broadcasting technologies. Many of these technologies, including cable and
subscription television, would serve diversity and facilitate local program-
ming by reducing scarcity.' 1 The FCC's efforts to regulate the existing
industry in order to promote non-commodity values delayed the develop-
ment of new market-based products and services that promise to serve
many aspects of diversity far better.
Finally, an air of paradox inevitably infects government efforts to use
centralized regulation in order to promote better or more diverse program-
158. The empirical evidence tends to show, however, that there may be greater demand for pro-
grams of the sort already carried by networks-entertainment, adventure, situation comedy-than for
programming of a different sort. See H. LEVIN, supra note 76.
159. See R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. MCGOWAN, supra note 99, at 116; B. OWEN, J. BEEKE & W.
MANNING, TELEVISION ECONOMICS 19 (1974).
160. See, e.g., Prime Time Access Rule, 50 F.C.C.2d 829, 889 (1975) (Commissioner Robinson
dissenting) (explaining reasons why rule failed to obtain goal of stimulating diverse, high quality non-
network programming in prime time); B. OWEN, J. BEEKE & W. MANNING, supra note 159, at 10
(unfavorable economics of local broadcasting).
161. See R. CASS, supra note 76; I. POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983).
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ming. The FCC never clearly stated whether its objective was the strongly
aspirational goal of better programs and more informed citizens or the
weaker goal of diversity. The FCC was also uncertain of the precise con-
tent that might be given to these objectives. No doubt an important con-
straint was the fear that explicit dictation of program requirements would
undermine the goal of diversity and violate liberal principles.162 Given
these difficulties, it would be comforting if deregulated markets turned out
to serve non-commodity values better than regulation. We should hesitate,
however, to conclude that the FCC's past efforts were a total failure or
that deregulation is a complete solution. The FCC's "raised eyebrow"
probably had a beneficial impact in promoting the development of high-
quality documentaries and in launching network news. It is not clear how
far new technologies will satisfy non-commodity values of aspiration or
diversity,s though cable systems invite a measure of local or state regula-
tion that may present opportunities to promote civic virtue.'"
The record of these and other regulatory efforts underscores the need
for specifying non-commodity objectives, determining whether regulation
is likely to advance them, and designing effective measures to promote
them. This task will require far more work in developing our rudimen-
tary understanding of non-commodity values, which have largely been ig-
nored by the emerging disciplines of policy analysis. There is a rich litera-
ture dealing with market failures, alternative correctional tools, cost-
benefit methodology, and other topics related to commodity values. Al-
though some scholars have made an important beginning, 65 nothing com-
parable exists in the case of non-commodity values.1 6
162. These principles are reflected in judicial interpretation of the First Amendment and the
prohibition of FCC "censorship" in 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1982).
163. There are, for example, indications that pay cable television cannot be relied on to generate
high-quality programs including serious drama and opera. See How a Cable System Flopped, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 28, 1983, at Dl, col. 3; O'Connor, Ahead for Cultural Programming, N.Y. Times, Dec.
12, 1982, at H33, col. 1. For discussion of the limited potential of deregulation for promoting program
variety, see Note, supra note 30. See also Mayer, Netweorks Are Accused of Neglecting Children in
Era of Deregulation, Wall St.J., Mar. 17, 1983, at 1, col 1.
164. But see Community Communications, Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982) (applying
federal antitrust law to municipal regulation of cable television).
165. See supra notes 108-09; S. KELMAN, supra note 115.
166. Professor Steven Kelman, for example, advocates that some resource allocation decisions be
made by non-market methods of choice, in order to develop what this Article calls non-commodity
values. S. KELMAN, supra note 115. But this general principle provides no guidance in determining
whether and to what extent any given subject-matter decision-television program format, for exam-
ple-should be reserved for one sector or another, or how non-market choices should be made. See
also Note, supra note 101 (discussing problems with determining which public lands are to be re-
served for wilderness or similar purposes).
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C. The Courts' Treatment of Non-Commodity Values
Cass Sunstein and I have argued elsewhere that the various remedial
"forms of action" in administrative law reflect three conceptions of the
regulatory purpose: the vindication of entitlements, the production of
wealth, and the advancement of other public values.167 The analysis in
this Article builds upon that framework, identifying aspiration, diversity,
mutuality, and civic virtue as key public values. A survey of judicial deci-
sions in the broadcast and environmental areas shows that courts have
often construed agencies' responsibilities to include the promotion of non-
commodity values. The D.C. Circuit, which exercises exclusive reviewing
powers over most FCC decisions, has promoted regulatory efforts designed
to encourage diverse, informative, high quality programs. When the FCC
has seemed laggard in this effort, the court has overruled the Commission
in order to promote "higher quality" programming,168 foster local broad-
casting,"89 and extend the fairness doctrine, which requires presentation of
differing views on controversial issues of public importance.170 Explicitly
invoking the notion of "diversity," the court has required the Commission
to preserve existing "quality" program formats.71 and to prohibit joint
ownership of newspapers and broadcast stations.172
Two powerful undercurrents appear to motivate these decisions, which
167. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1239-40.
168. In the name of promoting better quality broadcasting, the D.C. Circuit has interpreted the
hearing requirements of the Communications Act to restrict the FCC's power to favor existing licen-
sees in license renewal proceedings. See Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201
(D.C. Cir. 1971). It suggested that the FCC consider as aspects of "superior" broadcast performance
the "elimination of excessive and loud advertising" and "delivery of quality programs." Id. at 1213
n.35. Also relevant to evaluating quality of performance was the extent to which a broadcaster had
"reinvested the profit on his license to the service of the viewing and listening public." Id.
169. When, for example, the Commission declined to apply its policy favoring license applicants
who promise local programming to a case involving a suburban broadcast outlet in a large metropoli-
tan area, the court forced the Commission to adhere to that policy. See Pasadena Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 555 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
170. After the Commission had applied the doctrine to advertising for the first time in the case of
cigarette commercials, it declined to apply it to environmental issues assertedly raised by gasoline
advertising. The court reversed. Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
171. The D.C. Circuit discerned the diversity principle in the opaque "public interest, conve-
nience and necessity" language of the Communications Act. Invoking this principle, it has required
the Commission to review changes in radio broadcasters' program formats when the change (for ex-
ample, from classical to rock music) might eliminate the last instance of a given format (classical
music) in a community. See Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(en banc) (classical music); Citizens Comm. to Preserve the Voice of the Arts, WGKA-FM v. FCC,
436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Citizens Comm. to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d 926
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
172. The D.C. Circuit concluded that the diversity principle requires that existing newspaper-
broadcaster cross-ownership arrangements be dissolved, although the Commission had sought to ban
such arrangements only prospectively. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d
938 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd in part, 436 U.S. 775 (1978). In addition, the court suggested that avoid-
ance of concentration in media ownership should be a factor in license-renewal proceedings. See Citi-
zens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1213 nn.35 & 36 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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reflect a persistent use of suppletive principles by judges to redirect agency
decisionmaking. The first is a deep distrust of Commission backsliding in
response to the economic and political power of the broadcasters. The sec-
ond is a concern to promote non-commodity values of diversity, aspiration,
and civic virtue in the "wasteland" of advertiser-sponsored, network-
dominated television. These currents surfaced in the D.C. Circuit's deci-
sion in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 17 invalidating FCC programming
restrictions on cable television. The court found that such restrictions,
adopted by the FCC in order to protect over-the-air broadcasters, violated
the First Amendment as well as the diversity principle which the court
found implicit in the Communications Act.'74 It concluded that diversity
would be far better served by removing restrictions on market entry. 5 A
belief that established broadcasters had "captured" the Commission and
negotiated a self-serving deal that violates liberal principles is transparent
in the court's opinion.176
In Home Box Office the court championed a form of deregulation that
it believed would serve the interest in diversity better than did Commis-
sion regulation. Recent years have witnessed a more general movement in
favor of deregulation. Although greater diversity was the goal of the de-
regulation championed by Home Box Office, the deregulation movement
has also been fueled by public reaction to perceived regulatory excesses, 77
and by a heightened societal interest in the production of wealth. There
has been a corresponding cutback, led by the FCC and endorsed by the
Supreme Court, in regulatory ventures designed to secure non-commodity
values. In connection with broadcasting, many of the policies encouraged
or initiated by the D.C. Circuit have been truncated or abandoned. For
173. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
174. 567 F.2d at 27. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775
(1978). But see FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding FCC's authority to
forbid radio broadcast of words that were short of "obscene").
175. Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 39.
176. See id. at 33.
177. See supra p.1543.
178. The Supreme Court has rejected a claimed "right to access" whereby private groups would
be entitled to purchase time in order to air political messages. See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). It also reversed a D.C. Circuit holding requiring
that the FCC's ban on newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership be applied to all existing combinations.
See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978). The Supreme Court
has also endorsed the Commission's new policy of relying on marketplace competition to promote
diversity, overruling the D.C. Circuit's decisions to the contrary. See FCC v. WNCN Listeners'
Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
At the same time, the Commission has cut back on regulatory requirements, including those limit-
ing the amount of commercial advertising and those requiring public service programs by radio broad-
casters. See Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV.
207 (1982) (general description and defense of the FCC's recent deregulated "marketplace approach"
to broadcasting); see also Malrite T.V. of New York v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982) (upholding FCC removal of restrictions on cable television program-
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reasons previously canvassed, it may turn out that wide-scale deregula-
tion, coupled with the growth of new communications technologies, may
better serve non-commodity values such as diversity than do the regulatory
policies favored by the D.C. Circuit and previous Commissions.
The history of broadcast regulation can be understood as an exfoliating
process of incremental search for the proper relation between non-
commodity values and regulation.17 While "muddling through" may be
the inevitable mode of learning in public policy, better analysis-building
upon the economic and public-policy literature-might have prevented
some wrong turns and dead ends.18° The failure of Home Box Office and
decisions requiring preservation of particular program formats to distin-
guish between commodity and non-commodity regulatory objectives"'1 il-
lustrates the lack of such analysis. Such failure on the part of courts is
understandable, given their institutional limitations.1 "2 Far less excusable
is the FCC's failure to use available economic and policy analyses in its
decisions."' 3
The record of judicial review of administrative action in the environ-
mental field differs from that in broadcasting in important respects. Most
environmental statutes explicitly endorse the promotion of non-commodity
values such as wilderness preservation and health protection. These values
often have a quantifiable physical expression or analogue, such as acres of
wilderness preserved or quantities of air pollutants removed."8 It has also
ming); In re Deregulation of Radio, 49 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1, 25-31 (1981) (repealing FCC
guidelines respecting maximum number of commercial minutes per hour on radio); Report and Order,
49 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1, 8-14 (eliminating non-entertainment program guidelines); Termination
of Rulemaking, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,710 (1981) (termination of "kid-vid rulemaking" considering restric-
tions on television advertising directed at children). The D.C. Circuit itself has displayed second
thoughts about the fairness doctrine and has limited its reach. Consider, for example, the tortured
procedural history of National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (50 page
opinion followed by order scheduling rehearing en banc, vacating of that order, vacating of panel's
opinion, and remand to FCC with order to vacate its order), cert. denied sub noam. Accuracy in
Media, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 424 U.S. 910 (1976).
179. See J. KRIER & E. URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY 298-307 (1977) (discussing concept of
policy "exfoliation").
180. For examples of such analysis, see H. LEVIN, supra note 76; R. NOLL, M. PECK & J.
McGOWAN, supra note 99.
181. Consider, for example, the issues in Home Box Office. Would removal of program restric-
tions on cable result in undesirable "siphoning" or "cream skimming" by which the most desirable
programs would be snapped up by cable, leaving an inferior residue for viewers of "free" over-the-air
broadcasting? The issue can be seen in economic terms: Would this shift, to the extent that it is likely
to occur, result in a loss of consumer welfare? Or can it be seen in terms of non-commodity values:
Would such a shift increase the overall diversity and quality of programming? To what extent would
mutuality be undermined by conditioning access on ability to pay? The court of appeals failed to
recognize or pursue these questions.
182. See supra pp. 1537-38.
183. See Citizen's Comm. to Preserve the Voice of the Arts, WGKA-FM v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263
(D.C. 1970). The Commission's failure to use available economic understanding in promulgating a
prime-time access rule was cogently criticized by Commissioner Glen Robinson. See supra note 160.
184. There are, however, often grave uncertainties in determining the health or ecological risks
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proven far easier for courts to identify some of the economic costs associ-
ated with regulatory measures, particularly in the case of pollution
control.1
8 5
By requiring agencies to take a hard look at the environmental, eco-
nomic, and technological variables involved in regulatory choices, courts
hope to promote an appropriate balance between production and environ-
mental values. This balancing process, however, is generally unstructured
and leaves out important costs, such as delay and uncertainty, that have
no ready market measure. Moreover, the benefits of environmental protec-
tion are not broken down into their commodity and non-commodity com-
ponents. These gaps help explain why courts have failed to develop a suc-
cessful structure for making decisions.'
Although the "balancing" process spawned in pollution and toxic-
chemical cases is extremely crude and incomplete, it represents an advance
over the situation prevailing in cases involving natural resource manage-
ment and regulation. The opportunity costs of not developing resources
are often inherently difficult to measure. For example, the economic value
of the mineral development foregone by classifying federal lands as wil-
derness can, as a practical matter, only be determined by opening them to
exploration and development in order to determine what minerals lie hid-
den below the surface.18 7 The determination of benefits presents special
difficulties as well. While the number of acres in a wilderness can be
precisely measured, their qualitative importance cannot. This difficulty
reflects in part the problem of aggregation. In resource management, ad-
ministrative decisions and judicial review typically focus on particular
choices regarding particular parcels of land. But this "retail" focus is ill-
equipped to deal with non-commodity values, such as diversity, that arise
associated with various forms of environmental disruption. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 630-36 (1980) (health experts disagree on dangers of occupational
exposure to benzene).
185. For example, compliance outlays by regulated industries can be estimated. It is difficult,
however, to predict cost-reducing innovations that firms may develop if forced to comply. When com-
pliance takes the form of process changes, it may be difficult to allocate the outlays involved between
regulatory compliance and production cost reductions. Also, the economic losses associated with regu-
latory delays and uncertainties are difficult to measure. See Stewart, supra note 38.
186. Courts profess total agnosticism on the question of how the ultimate balance is to be struck.
Most courts generally reserve this choice for the responsible administrative agency to make. The clos-
est that courts have come to formulating a consistent approach to tradeoffs is a shutdown rule which,
in the case of significant health or ecological risks, permits or requires agencies to mandate controls up
to the point technologically and economically feasible without shutdown of a substantial percentage of
capacity. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1243-44.
187. See Tundermann, Preservation vs. Mineral Development of Withdrawn Federal
Lands-Mucd Ado, But Little to Show, 13 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,009, 10,017 (Jan. 1983). The United
States, unlike the Soviet Union, relies on industrial firms rather than government investigators to
survey and explore for mineral deposits on public lands. In order to provide an adequate incentive for
firms to undertake such exploration, they must be given substantial assurances that they will be per-
mitted to develop a deposit if one is found.
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out of aggregate patterns of resource use. For example, one might con-
clude that diversity is appropriately served by reserving a certain propor-
tion of wilderness lands from development. With the exception of a few
superb sites, however, it may not greatly matter which parcels make up
this total. Accordingly, the diversity principle provides little guidance in
deciding whether a particular site should be developed-which is how the
issue is usually presented to the courts.'
Despite, or perhaps because of, this aggregation problem, courts have
on occasion sought to protect non-commodity values by insisting on con-
siderable procedural rigor and clear statutory authority before an agency
authorizes the irreversible development or destruction of natural resources
of high aesthetic or ecological value."8 9 Here too, courts have developed
and enforced suppletive principles in order to promote non-commodity
values. These rulings can be understood as administrative law variants on
the public trust doctrine. 90 They represent a way of coping with institu-
tional limitations. Courts are ill-equipped to ascertain, on either a
"wholesale" or "retail" basis, the resources to be dedicated to various non-
commodity objectives. Instead, courts attempt to impose a more pointed
responsibility on other agencies of government, presumably institutionally
better qualified, to make such decisions only upon full and explicit consid-
eration of the non-commodity values at stake.
Courts have also supported efforts to promote non-commodity values in
environmental, broadcast, and other fields of regulation by making impor-
tant changes in general remedial and procedural doctrines. These changes
include expanded rights of standing and intervention, relaxed principles of
188. See Note, supra note 101, at 935-41.
189. Judges have imposed demanding procedural requirements upon administrative decisions to
locate an energy facility in an ecologically vulnerable or exceptionally scenic area. See, e.g., Seacoast
Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978); Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941
(1966). In the Georges Bank litigation, the court stayed the leasing of sites for offshore oil develop-
ment because a bill to provide additional environmental safeguards was pending in Congress. It found
that the Secretary of the Interior had fiduciary duties towards the resources in question. See Massa-
chusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1979). In the case of Redwoods National Park, both state
and federal courts took unusual steps to halt adjacent logging operations that threatened the ecological
value of the Park. See Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
These included a requirement that the Secretary of Interior seek additional Congressional funding to
take protective measures. The courts' prohibition of significant deterioration of air quality in existing
clean air areas can similarly be viewed as an effort to preserve non-market values of diversity against
erosion threatened by market pressure. See Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C.
1972), affd by an equally divided court, 412 U.S. 541 (1973); Stewart, supra note 111, at 718-20.
190. For advocacy of judicial use of public trust principles to control administrative decisions on
natural resource use, see Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C.D. L.
REV. 269, 310-11 (1980). This position is strongly criticized in Jawetz, The Public Trust Totem in
Public Land Law. Ineffective-And Undesirable-Judidal Intervention, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 455
(1982).
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ripeness, paper record requirements, and "hard-look" judicial review."'
Expanded rights of access and participation have enabled environmental,
viewer, and other public interest groups to provide a voice for non-
commodity values. Such representation helps assure that regulation re-
sponds to evolving social values.192 But the new remedial principles have
also benefited representatives of commodity values. Regulated firms, for
example, have made very effective use of paper record requirements and
hard-look review to challenge burdensome and poorly justified environ-
mental regulations.'9" With some important exceptions, the courts have
primarily sought to play a regulative role. They have attempted to lead
the agencies to a more informed, careful and discerning balance be-
tween-as the courts astigmatically see it-the productive benefits of un-
regulated markets, and the non-commodity values promoted by regulation.
Conclusion
In a liberal society, institutional design must protect liberal principles
against subversion by the private economic and ideological forces that
shape regulatory policy. If well-structured markets can convert the dross
of private interest into the gold of collective welfare, then institutions of
public governance may be capable of similar alchemy. In the context of
contract law, courts help structure the play of private interests in accor-
dance with collective norms, sometimes by imposing mandatory conditions,
but more often by drawing upon supplementing principles to give deter-
191. See generally R. STEWART & J. KRIER, supra note 117, at 618-732 (administrative law
aspects of environmental law).
Home Box Office is but one example of how courts demand clear statutory authority to justify what
seems to be an instance of private wealth redistribution or ideological imposition. Clear statement
principles have also been applied by reviewing courts to curb ideological overreaching. One example,
already noted, is the transportation control plan decisions invalidating sweeping controls on automo-
bile use. See supra p. 1579. Another is the Supreme Court's decidon in the Benzene case, Industrial
Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980). There, OSHA's health standards for
occupational exposure to benzene were struck down because data ensured only speculative benefits in
return for industry costs in excess of half a billion dollars. A similar logic appears in Supreme Court
decisions invalidating state restrictions on advertising by professionals. See Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
While the Home Box Office and EPA decisions were aimed at protecting diversity and decentrali-
zation, Benzene was aimed at preventing costly regulations that reduce wealth without substantially
advancing other regulatory ends. Because of this disparity in costs and benefits, the Labor Department
OSHA regulation could also be regarded as a form of private wealth transfer, by giving well-
organized petroleum workers, at the expense of consumers generally, far higher levels of protection
against risk than that enjoyed by workers or the public with respect to comparable risks. Clear state-
ment principles have also been employed by courts to protect entitlements. The creation in the labor
field of fair representation duties to prevent discrimination is perhaps the most notable example. See
Steele v. Louisville & N. Ry., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
Such judicial enforcement of clear statement principles is simply a dramatic example of the perva-
sive role that supplementing principles play in regulatory and administrative law.
192. See generally J. VINING, supra note 9, at 139-69 (discussing law and values).
193. See Stewart, supra note 111, at 727-33.
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minate content to agreements. In public law, the courts sometimes draw
upon the Constitution to impose mandatory conditions. More often, how-
ever, their work is suppletive, using statutory interpretation and adminis-
trative law to help give shape to regulatory programs. This Article shows
how the entitlement, production, and non-commodity conceptions inform
this work.
This Article has outlined some of the elements of a complex theory of
regulatory and administrative law, but many pieces are still missing and
major questions do not have even preliminary answers. For example, each
of the three conceptions examined in this Article can be understood as
securing different elements of the liberal ideal of plural excel-
lence-liberty, resources, self-development. This complexity is a virtue,
for, as we have seen, the American tradition of associational liberalism
cannot be reduced to a single formula. But complexity also exacts a price.
A complex theory must explain the relation among its constituent ele-
ments and determine their respective competencies.
The roles played by the various conceptions in regulatory policy have
varied over time and among different fields of regulation. For reasons al-
ready discussed, entitlements have played a relatively minor and often de-
rivative role in environmental law. Although broadcast policy has been
influenced by claims of entitlement based on the First Amendment,""' it,
like environmental law, has been largely shaped by a dialectical interplay
between commodity and non-commodity values, in which the weight given
to different elements has fluctuated. On the other hand, entitlement con-
ceptions have played a much larger role in other regulatory programs,
particularly those dealing with various forms of discrimination. In still
other areas of regulation, such as securities law, production concerns are
dominant. This Article has not offered any general account of these
variations.
A similar indeterminacy operates within the conception of non-
commodity values, which itself consists of several elements with differing
and sometimes conflicting implications for regulatory policy. The concep-
tion's distinctive and potentially unifying quality is its goal of promoting
self-critical choice, individual or joint.195 Unlike the rights and wealth-
maximizing conceptions, however, this conception has not achieved a fully
developed internal logic.
194. Fear of unconstitutional censorship has no doubt contributed to the FCC's reluctance to
regulate program content. In addition, broadcast licensees have successfully asserted what amounts to
a de facto entitlement to license renewal based on substantial investments in licenses and renewal
expectations. Despite the provisions in the Communications Act limiting licenses to a term of five
(formerly three) years, see 42 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1982), the FCC has failed to renew licenses in only a
few cases. See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 99, at 377-97.
195. See G. VICKERS, FREEDOM IN A ROCKING BOAT 27, 50-54 (1970).
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This Article has also raised but not resolved several associated institu-
tional questions. In our system, courts and litigation play an important
role in the effort to maintain an evolutionary balance among different con-
ceptions of social ends. But nothing in this essay warrants the conclusion
that the courts' role in these tasks is paramount to that of other institu-
tions of government, much less that courts have special license as guardi-
ans of any particular conception of regulation.
Some retail review of particular exercises of government power has
seemed a prudential necessity at both the constitutional and subconstitu-
tional levels. That necessity has arguably grown stronger with increases in
the scale of administrative government.1 96
In the past, judicial adjudication has traditionally assumed major re-
sponsibility for aligning the exercise of public power in the United States
with liberal principles. Enforcement of rights and correlative duties has
been considered the courts' distinctive role. While the foundations of our
administrative law still rest on private-law conceptions of rights, the ex-
pansion of regulation requires a reassessment of such traditions in the
administrative context. As we have seen, the entitlement conception has
only limited relevance to much regulatory administration. As we have also
noted, courts lack strong institutional capabilities to identify and imple-
ment regulatory policies that will enhance wealth. Finally, it is not at all
clear that courts possess a superior ability to sort out commodity and non-
commodity values and ascertain their appropriate roles in regulatory
programs.
These considerations suggest several different directions for regulatory
and administrative law. Recognition of the limited relevance of entitlement
conceptions and associated private law notions to contemporary regulation
may help stimulate the evolution of a more truly public administrative
law. At the same time, the importance of economic and policy competence
may dictate that a substantial portion of the subconstitutional reviewing
function could appropriately devolve onto non-judicial bodies. Internal ex-
ecutive branch review of regulatory measures is an example. The design
of new, economic-based regulatory strategies to promote flexible, decen-
tralized solutions and reduce the need for case-by-case review of particu-
lar commands can help lighten the strain on judicial competence and pro-
mote liberal values.
Answers to these questions of administrative policy and governance are
the subject of lively debate. This Article has sought to make clear that
successful answers must frankly acknowledge that regulation has impor-
196. But see J. MASHAW, supra note 3, at 202 (proposing elimination of judicial review of social
security disability decisions).
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tant non-commodity objectives along with the protection of entitlements
and the production of wealth.
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